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Agency Legislative Fixes 
Leigh Osofsky 
ABSTRACT: Legislative drafting mistakes can upset statutory schemes. The 
Affordable Care Act was nearly undone by such mistakes. The recent Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act is rife with them. Traditional legal scholarship has 
examined whether courts should help resolve Congress’ mistakes. But courts 
have remained stubbornly resistant to implementing fixes. 
In the face of legislative error and judicial inaction, administrative agencies 
have taken it upon themselves to fix legislative drafting mistakes. 
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of these “agency 
legislative fixes.” It identifies features and complexities of such fixes that 
existing scholarship does not capture. It also describes the behind-the-scenes, 
post-legislative dialogue between Congress and agency officials about such 
fixes, which is frequently hidden from public view. The Article shows that 
agencies routinely fix legislative drafting mistakes in a manner that is 
nontransparent and motivated by factors external to the legal framework.  
This Article argues that agency legislative fixes conflict with fundamental 
constitutional and democratic values such as legislative supremacy and 
agency legitimacy. They also exacerbate problematic agency guidance 
practices. Accordingly, this Article proposes changes to legislative and 
regulatory practices that may better address legislative drafting mistakes.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the end of 2017, the Republican party celebrated the passage of the 
sweeping tax reform generally known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”).1 
 
 1. The official title of the Act is “An Act [t]o provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles 
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House Speaker Paul Ryan declared that it had been a “promise made and [a] 
promise kept.”2 The next day, President Trump announced “[i]t’s always a lot 
of fun when you win.”3 This was the glory (for some) of the legislative process 
coming to fruition.  
While the news coverage largely moved on after legislative passage, the 
story was far from over. In the aftermath of the TCJA came the messy reality 
of enacted legislation. Part of the way Congress passed the TCJA 
notwithstanding united Democratic opposition was by doing so at breakneck 
speed and utilizing a variety of unprecedented procedures to pass major tax 
reform.4 The predictable result was that many mistakes had been made in 
drafting it. Congress had inadvertently eliminated the ability of sexual abuse 
victims to deduct their attorney fees,5 taxed low-income college students like 
trust fund babies,6 and imposed steep tax hikes on Gold Star Families,7 among 
many other cringe-worthy errors.8  
This ping-ponging between difficult yet exuberant legislative passage and 
subsequent realization of critical drafting errors is far from isolated to the 
recent TCJA. In 2015, the fate of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), President 
Obama’s signature legislative achievement, famously hung in the balance, 
turning on whether the Supreme Court would fix four words of the 
voluminous statute. If read literally, the four words, which seemed like a 
 
II and V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018.” Pub. L. No. 115-97, 
131 Stat. 2054 (2017) [hereinafter Tax Cuts and Jobs Act]. The title “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” 
could not be passed through reconciliation as a result of the application of the Byrd rule. Ellen 
P. Aprill & Daniel J. Hemel, The Tax Legislative Process: A Byrd’s Eye View, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 99, 100 (2018). For ease of exposition, the 2017 tax reform will nonetheless be referred 
to by its popular abbreviation of “TCJA.” 
 2. Bob Bryan, Paul Ryan Yelled in Delight and Triumphantly Slammed His Gavel as He Announced 
the GOP Tax Bill’s Passage, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2017, 2:51 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ 
paul-ryan-gavel-trump-gop-tax-reform-bill-passes-house-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/B239-MNFY].  
 3. Deirdre Walsh et al., White House, GOP Celebrate Passing Sweeping Tax Bill, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/20/politics/house-senate-trump-tax-bill/index.html [https:// 
perma.cc/PS55-AP3R] (last updated Dec. 20, 2017, 5:37 PM).  
 4. Jim Tankersley & Alan Rappeport, How Republicans Rallied Together to Deliver a Tax  
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/us/politics/ 
republican-tax-bill.html [https://perma.cc/32ZF-TU6H].  
 5. Robert W. Wood, IRS Gives Tax Break to Sexual Harassment Victims, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2019, 
8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2019/03/04/irs-gives-tax-break-to-sexual 
-harassment-victims [https://perma.cc/X2XN-WG8E].  
 6. Erica L. Green, Low-Income College Students Are Being Taxed like Trust-Fund Babies,  
N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/us/politics/college-
scholarships-tax-increases.html [https://perma.cc/R5UP-6423]. 
 7. Kate Sullivan, Tax Overhaul Means Some Gold Star Families Paying Much Higher Taxes on 
Survivor Benefits, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/24/politics/gold-star-families-higher-
taxes/index.html [https://perma.cc/FR2L-9992] (last updated Apr. 25, 2019, 9:45 PM).  
 8. See, e.g., Brian Faler, ‘This Is Not Normal’: Glitches Mar New Tax Law, POLITICO (Feb. 24, 
2018, 6:50 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/24/tax-law-glitches-gop-423434 
[https://perma.cc/3CH4-U7YK] (describing various errors in the TCJA). 
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simple legislative drafting mistake,9 threatened to unravel insurance markets 
essential to the entire legislative scheme.10 Major environmental issues, such 
as whether California can set the standard for certain emissions for all other 
states, have turned on whether or not the statute omitted words.11 And the 
functionality of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower regime has turned on a 
potential, failed cross-reference in the statute.12 A list of similar examples 
could go on and on.13  
The explanation for such drafting errors is quite similar to the 
explanation in the case of the TCJA. In an era of hyper-partisanship, political 
parties are turning to extraordinary procedures to push through legislative 
agendas without bipartisan support.14 These procedures, while a potentially 
useful way to break through gridlock, have eroded the traditional order of 
legislation, control of subject matter experts, and the quality of the legislative 
product. The result is that today’s legislation is highly vulnerable to errors. 
Making matters even worse, the use of extraordinary procedural methods to 
break through gridlock and get legislation passed often means that it is more 
difficult for Congress to fix the mistakes than it was to pass them in the first 
instance.15  
So, what should be done about such mistakes? In examining this 
question, scholars have typically focused on the judiciary: to what extent will 
courts correct legislative drafting mistakes or allow agencies to do so?16 The 
 
 9. Robert Pear, Four Words that Imperil Health Care Law Were All a Mistake, Writers Now Say, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/politics/contested-
words-in-affordable-care-act-may-have-been-left-by-mistake.html [https://perma.cc/PYW7-R76J] 
(detailing accounts from members of Congress explaining that the four words in question were 
a mere drafting mistake). 
 10. Id.  
 11. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1085–95 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
 12. See Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 778 (2018).  
 13. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1371–73 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(examining whether Congress used the word “category” as a stand-in for “category or 
subcategory” in a way that would allow the EPA to delist subcategories of carcinogens, and 
concluding that the EPA did not show that Congress did not mean what it said). 
 14. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 38–43.  
 15. See infra Section II.C for discussion of this understudied phenomenon.  
 16. See generally Jesse M. Cross, The Staffer’s Error Doctrine, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 83 (2019) 
(examining how staffers’ roles in the legislative process should affect judicial treatment of 
statutes); Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 811 (2016) (examining 
judicial treatment of legislative drafting mistakes and arguing for more expansive approach); 
Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of 
Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62 (2015) (examining options the Court had and the 
path it took in King v. Burwell); Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without 
Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501 (2015) (examining “de facto” rewrites of statutes by agencies 
as part of a study of agency deviations from the law, with a focus on the judicial response and 
doctrines, rather than the agency framework and potential legislative and regulatory solutions); 
Paul G. Mahoney, Canons of Construction for Dysfunctional Statutes: A Comment on Bennett, 75 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 577 (2018) (examining how courts should construe dysfunctional statutes); John 
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answer has been: not much. Courts tread very carefully in openly 
acknowledging that they are fixing any such mistakes or allowing agencies to 
do so. Indeed, as an illustration of this phenomenon, in two of the three cases 
mentioned above—the preemption of state emission standards,17 and the 
Dodd–Frank whistleblower regime18—the courts rejected agencies’ attempts 
to correct what they viewed to be errors, or omissions, in the statute.19 In the 
case of the ACA, the Supreme Court famously saved the ACA by essentially 
reading the mistake out of the statute, although, in doing so, it refused to 
defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute or acknowledge that it was 
correcting a mistake.20 The lengths to which the Court went to avoid 
acknowledging that it was essentially correcting a legislative drafting mistake 
or allowing an agency to do so underscores the reticence of courts to openly 
acknowledge they are correcting mistakes.21  
Scholars’ focus on judicial approaches overlooks a crucial, less-noticed 
reality. Agencies are quietly going about fixing legislative drafting mistakes, 
or engaging in what this Article calls “agency legislative fixes,” irrespective of 
what courts say. Agencies routinely use informal guidance to fix legislative 
drafting mistakes, or otherwise fix such mistakes in a way that is unlikely to be 
challenged by members of Congress. Indeed, in the case of the TCJA, after 
Congress sputtered in its attempts to fix its own legislative drafting mistakes 
in a timely fashion, the Treasury Department fixed some of the mistakes, while 
leaving others in place.22 Many members of Congress even appealed to 
Treasury to fix Congress’ legislative drafting mistakes.23 Yet, existing legal 
theory offers no framework for evaluating this phenomenon.  
 
F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2005) (examining related judicial 
application of absurdity doctrine to absurd statutory results).  
 17. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1091, 1100–05 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 18. See Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 778–82 (2018).  
 19. See, e.g., Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (reasoning 
that refusing to allow the SEC to correct the potential drafting error would be “illogical” and lead 
to “absurdity,” and citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493 n.3 (2015) in support of its 
reasoning), rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018)); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1100 
–05 (Tatel, J., concurring) (rejecting majority approach and instead arguing that the Court 
should recognize that Congress made a “clerical mistake” in drafting the statute).  
 20. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489–95 (explaining that “this [was] not a case for the IRS” and 
concluding that “an Exchange established by the State” refers to both state and federal exchanges 
for the purposes of tax credits, in part because the statute would not make sense absent such a 
reading).   
 21. See, e.g., id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[w]ords no longer have 
meaning if an Exchange that is not established by a State is ‘established by the State’”); Doerfler, 
supra note 16, at 843–57 (arguing that reticence to openly correct legislative drafting errors led 
litigants to make and the Court to adopt “deeply distorted interpretive rationales” in King and 
other cases).  
 22. See discussion infra Section III.B.  
 23. See infra notes 152–66 and accompanying text (describing the phenomenon in the case 
of qualified improvement property mistake).   
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This Article fills this gap by shining a light on agency legislative fixes and 
the thorny normative considerations they raise. Agency legislative fixes 
implicate fundamental constitutional and democratic values such as 
legislative supremacy and agency legitimacy. In terms of legislative supremacy, 
agency legislative fixes undermine the formal allocation of all lawmaking 
power to Congress. A more functional perspective yields a more nuanced 
analysis, which suggests that agency legislative fixes paradoxically may present 
a supremacy tradeoff. Under this tradeoff, agency legislative fixes may 
undermine Congress’ formal role as lawmaker, but also encourage more 
decisions to be made at the congressional level. However, this tradeoff is 
contingent and ultimately may not justify the formal infringement on 
Congress’ power. Agency legislative fixes also cannot clearly be justified as a 
legitimate exercise of agency power. In some ways, it may be possible to view 
agency legislative fixes as a legitimate exercise of agency expertise or, 
alternatively, agency authority to fill in ambiguity in statutory schemes. But 
these possibilities turn on deep, contested questions about agency legitimacy, 
as well as methods of statutory interpretation.  
There are some practical arguments in favor of agency legislative fixes, 
including concerns about the relationship between agencies and the public. 
But there are also practical problems with agency legislative fixes, including 
encouraging problematic agency guidance practices and systematically 
biasing the law in a pro-regulated party fashion. In any event, it is not clear 
that any practical case for agency legislative fixes could outweigh the 
unresolved constitutional and democratic problems. 
In light of the normative problems with agency legislative fixes, the 
Article concludes by evaluating potential paths forward. The easiest option 
would be to stick Congress with its own mistakes, forcing it to bear the costs 
of not making legislative fixes. But this option would impose significant costs 
on both agencies and the public. More proactively, the first-best solution 
would be for Congress to clean up its act by changing its legislative drafting 
practices to make fewer mistakes in the first instance. While ideal, this 
possibility also unrealistically assumes away the very disfunctions in legislative 
practices that make agency legislative fixes necessary.  
This Article argues for a more plausible second-best solution: changing 
the baseline for measuring eligibility for reconciliation legislation to allow 
Congress to fix its own mistakes pursuant to the same vote count that was 
necessary to make them. This fix has the potential to ameliorate the serious 
catch-22 presented by current legislative drafting practices.  
For those agency legislative fixes that will no doubt continue to some 
extent, agencies can make them more transparent and systematic. These 
changes at the agency level, without any changes in congressional practice, 
may promote some rule of law values, but at the cost of regularizing 
infringements on congressional power. This suggests that there may be some 
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value in Congress being more explicit about when agencies have authority to 
correct legislative drafting mistakes.  
The Article concludes that there are no easy ways to resolve the 
difficulties presented by agency legislative fixes. Agency legislative fixes are a 
pervasive phenomenon that responds to entrenched legislative problems. 
Exploring them, and the values undermined or vindicated by different paths 
forward, is essential to improving our system of governance. In the process of 
doing so, this Article advances conversations in a variety of recent literatures, 
including literatures regarding legislative drafting mistakes,24 congressional 
inaction,25 and the realities of legislation and regulation.26 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes both the conditions that 
systematically create legislative drafting mistakes and general judicial 
disapproval of non-congressional fixes of such mistakes. Part III explores how 
agencies can use informal guidance and other tactics strategically to offer 
agency legislative fixes, notwithstanding judicial disapproval. Part IV explores 
agency legislative fixes from a normative perspective. Part V examines 
potential paths forward. Part VI then offers a brief conclusion.  
II. LEGISLATIVE DYSFUNCTION PAIRED WITH JUDICIAL AVERSION TO  
NON-CONGRESSIONAL FIXES 
Agency legislative fixes occur because, in the aftermath of legislation, 
agencies often find themselves stuck between a rock (legislative dysfunction) 
 
 24. See sources cited supra note 16.  
 25. A number of recent works have examined legal outgrowths of this problem, see 
generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Preemption and Commandeering Without Congress, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
2029 (2018) (explaining how congressional gridlock makes states a focal point in national 
policymaking and outlining potential threats to their ability to act); Daniel T. Deacon, 
Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548 (2016) (investigating the case for administrative 
forbearance authority as a form of congressional delegation); and Jody Freeman & David B. 
Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (arguing that agencies are best 
suited to update statutes in the face of congressional inaction).  
 26. The empirical legal literature here is significant and growing, see generally Lisa Schultz 
Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014) (exploring, 
empirically, the factors that drive the legislative drafting process); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. 
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002) 
(exploring, empirically, differences in the way the judiciary and the legislature view the drafting 
process and how that may affect statutory interpretation); Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Z. Osofsky, 
Constituencies and Control in Statutory Drafting: Interviews with Government Tax Counsels, 104 IOWA L. 
REV. 1291 (2019) (examining, empirically, tax law drafting and formulation decisions); Jarrod 
Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 807 (2014) (examining the steps in statutory drafting and contending that drafting has 
evolved to become far more specialized); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 79 (2015) (outlining the essential elements of the legislative drafting process); and 
Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377 (2017) (describing the 
technical drafting assistance that agencies provide to the legislative drafting process and its 
potential effects). 
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and a hard place (judicial aversion to non-congressional legislative fixes). This 
Part explains how current legislative practices are increasingly producing 
legislative drafting mistakes that Congress is unable, itself, to fix, and how 
courts are averse to non-congressional legislative fixes. 
A. LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MISTAKES 
A legislative drafting mistake exists when a drafting error results in the 
legislative text failing to carry out Congress’ intent. The easiest way to 
understand this category is to define it narrowly. For instance, in the context 
of judicial fixes, Justice Scalia distinguished “mistake[s] of expression,” which 
may be seen as synonymous with the category of legislative drafting mistakes, 
from mistakes of “legislative wisdom,” which may not.27 
While it is easy to provide this definition of legislative drafting mistakes, 
it is much harder to identify them and, in some ways, they are in the eye of 
the beholder. Mistakes in policy, for instance, seemingly should not be 
classified as mere legislative drafting mistakes because, while perhaps ill-
decided, mistakes in policy reflect Congress’ intent at the time of drafting the 
statute. But how to draw the line between what is a mere mistake in drafting 
(which presumably failed to reflect Congress’ intent at the time of drafting) 
and what is a mistake in policy is not always entirely clear. Some mistakes are 
obviously mere drafting errors, because the existence of the mistakes makes 
the statute absurd or nonsensical.28 But, it is equally possible for a statute to 
make sense, but for its text to still fail to reflect Congress’ intent. For instance, 
by accidentally omitting a word (such as “not”), the statute may reach a 
sensical outcome, even if it is the exact opposite of what Congress intended. 
In situations in which legislative history or purpose are clear, such a mistake 
may be clear to interpreters willing to look to such sources. But many 
interpreters may not be willing to look to such sources to interpret the text, 
and, in any event, legislative history and legislative purpose may not always be 
available. This may be especially true in an era of frenzied legislative passage.29 
The fact that there is no easy, or agreed-upon, way to identify a legislative 
drafting mistake makes it more difficult for courts and agencies to act 
appropriately or uniformly when Congress does not fix its own mistakes. 
Legislative drafting mistakes can come from a variety of sources. Least 
controversially, many would agree that typos constitute legislative drafting 
mistakes. Many would also agree that legislative drafting mistakes include 
failures to appreciate how interlinkages between different provisions produce 
 
 27. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 3, 20 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 87–93.  
 29. See, e.g., Stephen K. Cooper, Technical Corrections Bill May Ride on December Tax Extenders, 
160 TAX NOTES 1162, 1163 (2018) (discussing limited legislative history available in the case of the 
TCJA).  
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a result that conflicts with what Congress intended. But there also has to be 
some limit to what counts as a legislative drafting mistake.  
B. HYPER-PARTISANSHIP AND NON-TEXTBOOK LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
In textbook versions of the legislative process, legislation flows through 
Congress in an orderly and deliberative fashion.30 Such legislation would 
originate in either the House of Representatives or the Senate.31 In whichever 
chamber it originates, the legislation would be referred to a committee that is 
a subject matter expert.32 After the committee finalized the proposed 
legislation, it would bring the legislation to the rest of the chamber for a 
vote.33 The chamber would defer at least to some extent to the committee’s 
expertise, and the committee ideally would have sorted out how to get the 
chamber’s approval of the proposed legislation. The chamber would then 
vote on the proposed legislation without making significant amendments. If 
the chamber voted to approve the legislation, the legislation would then pass 
to the other chamber, which would replicate the same process using its own 
expert committee.34 After the second chamber voted on the legislation, a 
conference committee would reconcile the legislation, if need be.35 The 
conference committee would be staffed by both Congresspeople and 
professional staffers with subject matter expertise, and the work they 
produced, by and large, would be the proposal considered by the entire 
Congress.36 Congress would then vote on the product of the conference 
committee which, if approved, would pass to the President to sign or veto.37  
Today’s legislative process deviates significantly from this textbook 
portrayal. There are many reasons for such deviations, but hyper-partisanship 
is a particularly important one. Political scientist Barbara Sinclair has 
described that “[i]ntense partisan polarization is the single most salient 
characteristic of contemporary politics and one that increasingly shapes the 
legislative process.”38 Hyper-partisanship has become both a cause and an 
 
 30. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 14–17 (9th 
ed. 2014). 
 31. JOHN V. SULLIVAN, HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-49, at 5, 8–9 (2007); 
Brian Nutting, The Legislative Process, in 1 CQ PRESS, GUIDE TO CONGRESS 576–77 (7th ed. 2013). 
 32. SULLIVAN, supra note 31, at 9.  
 33. Nutting, supra note 31, at 576. 
 34. Id. at 580.  
 35. Christopher J. Deering, The Committee System, in 1 CQ PRESS, GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra 
note 31, at 666. 
 36. See SULLIVAN, supra note 31, at 14–15 (explaining final committee actions); OLESZEK, 
supra note 30, at 30–31 (describing the expertise of lawmakers and committee staff).  
 37. See SULLIVAN, supra note 31, at 50–51; Nutting, supra note 31, at 576. 
 38. BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. 
CONGRESS 166 (5th ed. 2017); see, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes 
of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 276–81 (2011) (describing 
emergence of hyperpolarized democracy); George K. Yin, Crafting Structural Tax Legislation in a 
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effect of congressional dysfunction. As a cause, hyper-partisanship contributes 
to gridlock, which makes it difficult to pass legislation through ordinary 
procedures.39 As an effect, the political parties have increasingly turned to 
partisan means of passing legislation. Party leadership and their staffers, as 
well as the President, are now often involved in not only shepherding 
legislation through Congress, but also promoting their own versions of 
legislation and entertaining suggestions from members to make changes.40 As 
a result, there is much less deference to expert committees. Legislation is 
often passed in ways that bypass committees entirely.41 The deterioration of 
expert committee control has also made post-committee amendments more 
common, especially in passing major legislation.42 The rise of post-committee 
amendments means members may make a whole slew of rapid-fire changes 
after committee approval of the legislation. There will in many cases be little 
time or inclination to consider how such amendments fit within the scheme 
of the new proposed legislation, much less the entire existing legislative 
scheme.43  
 
Highly Polarized Congress, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 243–45 (2018) (describing evidence 
of increasing polarization in Congress); Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RES.  
CTR. (June 12, 2014), https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-
american-public [https://perma.cc/D9NR-NQGU] (detailing high levels of partisan divides and 
antipathy).  
 39. See, e.g., ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 220–22 (3d 
ed. 2007) (describing how party polarization has interfered with the ability of the appropriations 
committees to complete their basic appropriations functions); SINCLAIR, supra note 38, at 159 
–66 (linking rise in polarization to changes in legislative procedures); David R. Jones, Party 
Polarization and Legislative Gridlock, 54 POL. RES. Q. 125, 133–37 (2001) (finding that polarization 
increases the likelihood of gridlock). 
 40. SCHICK, supra note 39, at 219; BARBARA SINCLAIR, PARTY WARS: POLARIZATION AND THE 
POLITICS OF NATIONAL POLICY MAKING 1–35 (2006); John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, The 
Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in 
Conditional Party Government, in POLARIZED POLITICS: CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN 
ERA 31, 33–34 (Jon R. Bond & Richard Fleisher eds., 2000); Yin, supra note 38, at 250. 
 41. Individual legislative products that could not each make their way through Congress 
may be combined into extremely large, complex “omnibus” bills. See, e.g., JAMES V. SATURNO  
& JESSICA TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32473, OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS ACTS: 
OVERVIEW OF RECENT PRACTICES 9 (2016), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
RL32473.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6L5-QATM] (describing the rise of omnibus appropriations 
acts and the inclusion of significant legislative provisions within them). These omnibus bills are 
passed through multiple committees, in a way that undermines any one committee’s ability to 
ensure the functionality of the legislation. Bressman & Gluck, supra note 26, at 760–61.  
 42. See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44362, POST-COMMITTEE ADJUSTMENT IN THE 
MODERN HOUSE: THE USE OF RULES COMMITTEE PRINTS (2016), available at https://crsreports. 
congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44362/3 [https://perma.cc/9MGV-9FBC] (discussing how 
changes to proposed legislation are often discussed after the legislation is introduced from a 
committee). 
 43. The TCJA provided a particularly notable example of this phenomenon, as the media 
widely circulated reports of handwritten, difficult-to-decipher notes being added to the legislation 
in its final stages. Jim Tankersley & Alan Rappeport, A Hasty, Hand-Scribbled Tax Bill Sets Off  
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There may be some reasons to cheer some of these developments. As 
some scholars have pointed out, the Constitution does not require Congress 
to use any specific procedures.44 In some ways, Congress’ ability to pass 
legislation in an age of hyper-partisanship may be seen as a testament to 
Congress’ ability to get things done.45 Furthermore, the deterioration of 
committee control may arguably allow for more diffuse participation by 
outside individuals and groups, which might bring broader perspectives to 
bear.46 
But it is also clear that these changes have costs. Much less control by 
subject-matter experts (both at the congressional member and staffer level) 
may reduce the legislation’s quality.47 Party leadership and their political 
staffers often have less of an eye toward the integrity of the legislation than 
committee members and nonpartisan staffers who are subject-matter 
experts.48 And legislating outside of the textbook process, such as through 
post-committee amendments and extreme legislative bundling, is also more 
likely to be chaotic, with inputs coming from many different sources, and a 
lower ability for a single coordinator (or multiple coordinators) to sort 
through the inputs carefully. Short timelines exacerbate these difficulties. 
The result is that, relative to legislation passed through the textbook process, 
today’s legislation is less likely to cohere in sensible ways, and specific 
provisions may be drafted erroneously in ways that fail to carry out Congress’ 
intent.49  
This is not to say that legislation passed in a slower, more deliberative, 
bipartisan fashion would not also have its share of significant problems. 
Mistakes may be inevitable in any major piece of legislation.50 But the 
 
an Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/us/politics/ 
hand-scribbled-tax-bill-outcry.html [https://perma.cc/3DVK-3H8L].  
 44. Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox 
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1795 (2015) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each 
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”)).  
 45. R. Shep Melnick, The Conventional Misdiagnosis: Why “Gridlock” Is Not Our Central Problem 
and Constitutional Revision Is Not the Solution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 767, 775–81 (2014).  
 46. See, e.g., SINCLAIR, supra note 38, at 268 (surmising as much); Michael Doran, Legislative 
Entrenchment and Federal Fiscal Policy, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 46–49 (2018) (examining 
entrenching and its impact on the committee system).  
 47. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, The State of America’s Tax Institutions, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 7, 7, 22 (2018) (lamenting that “[i]deology increasingly carries the day over the influence 
of experts”).  
 48. Yin, supra note 38, at 255–69.  
 49. Mahoney, supra note 16, at 588 (“[T]he Court is likely to confront more and more cases 
asking whether the word ‘blue’ actually means ‘orange.’ We should discuss the elephant in the 
room: Congress no longer legislates carefully, and what it produces is often an incoherent mess.”).  
 50. See, e.g., Robert D. Hershey Jr., A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN TAX POLICY; Congress to Tackle 
Taxes, Again, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/08/business/a-
new-era-in-american-tax-policy-congress-to-tackle-taxes-again.html [https://perma.cc/T3HU-
72YD] (pointing to the technical corrections needed for the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a bipartisan 
effort enacted with significantly more deliberation than the TCJA).  
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combination of increasingly complex legislation being passed in a rushed 
fashion, with decreased expert control, often through the use of chaotic 
congressional procedures, exacerbates legislative drafting mistakes. 
C. CONGRESS’ INCREASED USE OF RECONCILIATION MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT TO 
FIX LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MISTAKES 
Not only is Congress more likely to make mistakes in today’s legislative 
process, but it is also harder for Congress to fix mistakes. This is the 
underappreciated result of Congress using special congressional procedures 
to break through partisan gridlock. 
A particularly important procedure in this regard has been Congress’ 
increasing use of reconciliation. Reconciliation was a procedure created by 
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (“Budget 
Act”).51 Prior to the Budget Act, Congress had no official procedure to bring 
all of its revenue and spending decisions together in a comprehensive 
budget.52 The Budget Act provided Congress the ability to do so.53 The Budget 
Act requires Congress to first pass a budget resolution.54 While not itself law, 
the budget resolution creates a framework that enables Congress to pass laws 
in a manner consistent with the budget resolution.55 After passing a budget 
resolution, Congress can then direct congressional committees to pass 
reconciliation legislation to bring revenues and direct spending in line with 
the budget resolution.56 To ensure that pressing budget legislation can be 
passed expeditiously, the Budget Act made reconciliation legislation immune 
from the Senate filibuster, as well as certain other legislative obstacles.57 This 
effectively means that reconciliation legislation is subject to a majority, rather 
than supermajority, vote requirement in the Senate.  
The lower required vote count prompted Congress to quickly begin using 
reconciliation to pass legislation in a more expansive fashion than originally 
 
 51. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,  
§ 310, 88 Stat. 297, 315–16.  
 52. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution: The Anatomy of the 
1995–96 Budget “Train Wreck,” 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 591–92 (1998).  
 53. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act § 2; SCHICK, supra note 39, at 18–19. 
 54. 2 U.S.C. § 632 (2012).  
 55. SCHICK, supra note 39, at 118–19.  
 56. 2 U.S.C. § 641. 
 57. See, e.g., id. § 641(e)(2) (limiting debate in the Senate on reconciliation bills to not 
more than 20 hours); BILL HENIFF JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30862, THE BUDGET 
RECONCILIATION PROCESS: THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 1 (2016), available at https:// 
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30862.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK96-RPZV] (describing the expedited 
procedures); Rebecca M. Kysar, Tax Law and the Eroding Budget Process, 81 LAW & CONTEMP.  
PROBS. 61, 67–68 (2018) (explaining how reconciliation is not subject to the filibuster and thus, 
paradoxically, has likely allowed the filibuster to last longer).  
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intended when Congress passed the Budget Act.58 This more expansive use of 
reconciliation, in turn, led to congressional concerns that the reconciliation 
process was being manipulated to pass non-budget legislation. In 1985, 
Senator Byrd explained that “we are in the process now of seeing . . . the 
Pandora’s box which has been opened to the abuse of the reconciliation 
process. That process was never meant to be used as it is being used.”59  
In order to preserve the efficacy of reconciliation and the integrity of 
congressional procedures generally, Senator Byrd offered an amendment to 
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, which was 
designed to limit reconciliation to its original budgeting purposes.60 The so-
called Byrd rule allows Senators to raise “points of order,” objecting to 
provisions they believe are extraneous.61 If an objection is sustained, the 
provision will be dropped from the bill (in what is often colloquially referred 
to as Byrd droppings),62 or otherwise stricken from the bill.63 Over time, the 
Byrd rule was expanded, made permanent, and codified. In its present form, 
the Byrd rule defines as extraneous any provision that, among other things 
“does not produce a change in outlays or revenues . . . [or that] produces 
changes in outlays or revenues which are merely incidental to the non-
budgetary components of the provision.”64  
However, the Byrd rule has not functioned well over time and has proven 
easily manipulated.65 Since passage of the Byrd rule, reconciliation has been 
used repeatedly to pass major legislation, oftentimes in ways that is difficult to 
square with its intended, original, limited scope.66 This has reached somewhat 
of a zenith in recent years. The Obama administration used reconciliation to 
 
 58. See HENIFF JR., supra note 57, at 7 (listing budget reconciliation measures enacted or 
vetoed between 1980 and 2016).  
 59. 131 CONG. REC. 28,968 (1985) (statement of Sen. Byrd). 
 60. HENIFF JR., supra note 57, at 2.  
 61. JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-865, POINTS OF ORDER IN THE 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS 1 (2015), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
97-865.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAR3-V6RR].  
 62. Jay Newton-Small, Alan Frumin: Health Reform’s Reconciliation Ref, TIME (Mar. 3, 2010), 
http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1969267,00.html [https://perma.cc/ 
592A-BM4V]. 
 63. 2 U.S.C. § 644(e) (2012); Aprill & Hemel, supra note 1, at 105–07. 
 64. 2 U.S.C. § 644(b).  
 65. See, e.g., Aprill & Hemel, supra note 1, at 108–26 (outlining in detail the effects and 
perversions of the Byrd rule); George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability,  
and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 222–24 (2009) (lamenting a particularly perverse 
application of the Byrd rule, which ultimately resulted in the inclusion of an additional tax cut).  
 66. See HENIFF JR., supra note 57, at 7 (listing budget reconciliation measures enacted into 
law through 2016). But see, e.g., Aprill & Hemel, supra note 1, at 101–02 (arguing that the Byrd 
rule may have some benefits, such as serving as an obstacle to special interests or helping to 
“preserve[] a [negotiating seat] for the minority party”). 
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pass the ACA—major, transformative health care legislation.67 The Trump 
administration then used reconciliation to pass the TJCA—a massive overhaul 
of the tax code.68 Both uses of reconciliation go well beyond short-term 
budgeting adjustments.  
The fact that the Byrd rule is highly manipulable does not mean it has no 
bite at all. It does shape what legislation can go through reconciliation, even 
if it does so in unsatisfying ways. The process for determining whether a 
provision is “extraneous” within the meaning of the Byrd rule is complicated 
and opaque.69 According to the Byrd rule, the Presiding Officer of the Senate 
makes determinations about whether a provision is extraneous.70 Since the 
question turns on how the proposed legislation affects the budget, the 
Presiding Officer has to assess what the budget score (or impact) for the 
proposed legislation will be. In practice, the Presiding Officer turns to  
the Budget Committee Chair, who, by historical practice, turns to the 
Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) and Joint Committee on Taxation 
(“JCT”), to determine whether the legislation follows the reconciliation 
instructions and whether it increases the deficit beyond the budget window.71 
The Presiding Officer turns to the Senate Parliamentarian for other Byrd rule 
points of order, including whether the legislation produces a non-incidental 
change in outlays or revenues.72 The Senate Parliamentarian, a somewhat 
obscure figure deep inside the Senate, makes these decisions largely out of 
public view based on criteria that are not entirely apparent.73 Senator Judd 
Gregg, the one-time top Republican on the Budget Committee, described the 
Senate Parliamentarian as “the defense counsel, he’s the prosecution, he’s the 
judge, he’s the jury and he’s the hangman.”74 
The increasing use of reconciliation to pass major legislation, and the 
accompanying limitations of the Byrd rule, have had perverse and surprising 
 
 67. See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 57, at 67 (citing “Democrats[’] controversial[] use[] [of] 
reconciliation to enact parts of [the ACA’s] major healthcare reform”); Newton-Small, supra note 
62 (quoting former Senate parliamentarian Bob Dove’s explanation that the “use of [sidecar] 
reconciliation [in the ACA was] highly unusual”).  
 68. Kysar, supra note 57, at 69 (citing “unprecedented” use of reconciliation to pass major 
tax reform in the case of the TCJA).  
 69. Aprill & Hemel, supra note 1, at 136; Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the 
Budget and Tax Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 882 (2002).  
 70. 2 U.S.C. § 644(e) (2012); Aprill & Hemel, supra note 1, at 105–07. 
 71. Aprill & Hemel, supra note 1, at 105–06; see HENIFF, JR., supra note 57, at 1–2; JAMES V. 
SATURNO, BILL HENIFF JR. & MEGAN S. LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42388, THE 
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION 9 (2016), available at https:// 
www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/8013e37d-4a09-46f0-b1e2-c14915d498a6.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5H3H-6YRW]. 
 72. See, e.g., IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43532, OFFICES AND OFFICIALS  
IN THE SENATE: ROLES AND DUTIES 14 (2015), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R43532.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q3A-LWFJ] (describing the role of the Parliamentarian).  
 73. Aprill & Hemel, supra note 1, at 107.  
 74. Newton-Small, supra note 62. 
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impacts on Congress’ ability to correct its own legislative drafting mistakes. To 
fix legislation through reconciliation, the fix itself must meet reconciliation 
requirements, including the Byrd rule.75 This means that the corrective 
legislation, among other things, must have a non-incidental impact on 
revenues or outlays. Making this determination depends on whether the fix 
impacts revenue or outlays relative to the original legislation, which, after its 
passage, represents the baseline for evaluating future changes. A critical 
question in making this evaluation is whether the baseline should be the 
original legislation as it was actually enacted, or the original legislation as it 
was erroneously scored when it was enacted. This is an issue because, when a 
mistake was made in the original legislation, the budget score for the original 
legislation often reflects Congress’ intent in passing the legislation, not the 
mistake that was made in passing it, because even budget scorers often do not 
realize that drafting mistakes have been made until after the scoring.76  
For instance, imagine an original piece of legislation provides a new tax 
credit for taxpayers who provide financial support to qualifying relatives.77 
Among other things, qualifying relatives must have income that falls below an 
exemption amount.78 “Exemption amount” is defined elsewhere, in an 
existing section of the tax code.79 Unrelatedly, in the same, original 
legislation, Congress temporarily reduces the “exemption amount” to zero.80 
In enacting the legislation, neither Congress nor the budget scorers pick up 
on how the latter change would affect the newly enacted qualifying relative 
tax credit. This yields the unintended consequence that, as a technical matter, 
Congress has just inadvertently created a new tax credit for which essentially 
no individuals will qualify. But because the scorers, like the drafters of the 
original legislation, did not recognize this at the time of enactment, the score 
for the original legislation took into account the full cost for the qualifying 
relatives tax credit as Congress intended for it to operate.  
If Congress wants to pass new legislation to fix the mistake made in the 
original legislation, should the baseline for determining the cost of the new 
legislation be the legislation as enacted (in which case the new legislation 
affects revenue because, as a matter of law, essentially no one is actually 
eligible for the tax credit)? Or should the baseline be the legislation as it was 
erroneously scored (in which case the new legislation would not affect 
revenue because the score for the original legislation reflected the cost of this 
 
 75. 2 U.S.C. § 644. 
 76. See, e.g., Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24 (D.D.C.), rev’d and remanded sub nom. 
Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted and judgment vacated, No. 
14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (discussing how CBO assumptions differed 
from actual text in the case of the ACA). 
 77. This example actually occurred in the TCJA. See I.R.C. § 24(h)(4) (2018).  
 78. Id. § 152(d)(1)(B). 
 79. Id. § 151(d)(5)(A). 
 80. Id. 
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new tax credit)? This seemingly technical question has extraordinary 
importance. In an era in which Congress increasingly passes major, flawed 
legislation through reconciliation, how this question is answered plays a 
significant role in determining Congress’ ability to fix its own mistakes. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the question, there is surprisingly 
little attention that has been paid to it. There are no clear rules for how the 
Byrd rule should be applied in this case, though current practice is to use the 
original legislation as it was erroneously scored as a baseline.81 As applied to 
the example above, the baseline is the full cost for the qualifying relatives tax 
credit, as Congress had intended for it to operate. But this yields a 
conundrum: Relative to the baseline, fixing the mistake would not impact 
revenue, because the erroneous score assumed the fix Congress now wants to 
make.82 Current practice thus treats fixes of legislative drafting mistakes as 
ineligible for reconciliation.83 As a result, Congress cannot fix in 
reconciliation mistakes that apply as a matter of law. 
By itself, this conundrum would not necessarily thwart attempts to fix the 
legislative drafting mistakes. In theory, Congress could just pass legislation 
through the regular legislative process (i.e., outside of reconciliation) to fix 
the flaws in the original legislation. But, as a practical matter, the majority 
party often does not have the votes to fix the legislation through the regular 
legislative process. The majority party likely used reconciliation to begin with 
because it lacked the votes necessary to push the legislation through the 
regular process. Even to the extent the minority party agrees the fixes would 
be a net improvement, the minority party is often unwilling to participate in 
fixing mistakes because the majority originally passed the legislation in a 
hyper-partisan fashion.84 Without the ability to correct the legislation it passed 
 
 81. See, e.g., Marc J. Gerson, Technically Speaking: The Art of Tax Technical Corrections, 114 TAX 
NOTES 927, 935 n.79 (2007) (pointing out that “[u]nder the Senate’s so-called Byrd rule, 
technical corrections generally cannot be included as part of a revenue reconciliation bill because 
such corrections by definition do not have a revenue impact”); Dustin Stamper, Taxwriters Making 
Tough Choices on Reconciliation Tax Bills, 109 TAX NOTES 714, 716 (2005) (explaining that 60 votes 
are needed to move technical corrections through the Senate because “the so-called Byrd rule 
does not allow provisions without revenue implications to move in a reconciliation bill”). Why, 
exactly, this is the case is generally unarticulated. See infra Section V.C.1 for further discussion of 
why the results reached under current practices are not clearly required and how they might be 
changed.  
 82. See, e.g., Business Groups Urge Congress to Support Bill to Fix TCJA Error, TAX NOTES TODAY 
(Apr. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Letter from Businesses], https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-
federal/depreciation-amortization-and-depletion/business-groups-urge-congress-support-bill-
fix-tcja-error/2019/04/29/29f7j [https://perma.cc/S596-WXGH] (noting that “current law 
was scored as if the QIP [qualified improvement property] mistake were not made”).  
 83. See, e.g., Jim Tankersley & Alan Rappeport, G.O.P. Rushed to Pass Tax Overhaul. Now It 
May Need to Be Altered., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/ 
11/us/politics/tax-cut-law-problems.html [https://perma.cc/D7UN-2DHH] (explaining the 
congressional consensus in the context of the TCJA).  
 84. See, e.g., Jonathan Bernstein, Why the Tax Bill’s Errors Won’t Be Fixed, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 
12, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-12-12/why-the-tax-
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through reconciliation, and without the assent of the minority party, the 
majority party may be unable to fix the drafting mistakes. This has turned the 
correction of legislation—previously thought to be a routine part of the 
legislative process85—into a surprisingly difficult task. This is not to say that 
corrections can never happen.86 The critical point is that Congress’ 
increasingly expansive use of reconciliation in hyper-partisan times is 
systematically making it more difficult for Congress to fix the mistakes that it 
is increasingly likely to make. 
This set of dynamics strikingly occurred in the signature legislative 
achievements from the current and prior presidential administrations—the 
TCJA and the ACA. In the TCJA, the lack of any Democratic votes meant that 
the Republican Congress had to pass the original legislation through 
reconciliation.87 Democrats in part passed the ACA through reconciliation 
without any Republican votes.88 In both cases, Congress made significant 
legislative drafting mistakes. In the context of the TCJA, commentators 
described the massive tax reform as littered with glitches and errors as a result 
of the rushed legislative process.89 In the context of the ACA, the haphazard 
procedures used to secure legislative passage resulted in a number of critical 
mistakes, including one that threatened to imperil the entire legislative 
scheme.90 Yet, in both cases, as a result of the application of the Byrd rule and 
the scoring dynamics outlined above, the mistakes could not be fixed through 
reconciliation. In each case, the party excluded from the original process 
—Democrats in the case of the TCJA and Republicans in the case of the 
ACA—refused to participate in fixing the mistakes made in legislative passage 
in a timely fashion.91 In the case of the TCJA, the minority party, the 
 
bill-s-errors-won-t-be-fixed [https://perma.cc/C587-LNHH] (describing this dynamic in the 
context of ACA and TCJA).  
 85. Id. (describing technical corrections as previously a “routine” part of the process).  
 86. See infra text accompanying notes 241–42 for discussion of when Congress may fix its 
own mistakes.  
 87. Jasmine C. Lee & Sara Simon, How Every Senator Voted on the Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/19/us/politics/tax-bill-senate-live-
vote.html [https://perma.cc/8YKK-HWWX].  
 88. The procedural story with the ACA was particularly complicated. Democrats held a 
supermajority in the Senate when the House and Senate passed separate versions of the 
legislation in 2009. However, the death of Senator Kennedy and his replacement by Republican 
Scott Brown meant that the House passed the Senate version of the legislation along with a 
reconciliation “sidecar” that made the legislation palatable to the House and passable by the 
Senate through reconciliation, given the Senate’s new political situation. HENIFF JR., supra note 
57, at 18. 
 89. See Faler, supra note 8 (quoting expert tax analyst Marty Sullivan, as saying, “[t]his is not 
normal. . . . There’s always this kind of stuff, but the order of magnitude is entirely different.”).  
 90. Pear, supra note 9.  
 91. Bernstein, supra note 84; Emily L. Foster, TCJA-ACA Trade-Off Is Possible ‘Glimmer of Hope’ 
for Tax Fixes, 163 TAX NOTES 145, 145–46 (2019) (explaining how the dynamic was the same 
post-ACA and post-TCJA); Tory Newmyer, The Finance 202: The Next Fight over the GOP Tax Package 
Is Just Around the Corner, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
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Democrats, belatedly began suggesting that they may join in a technical 
corrections bill.92 However, they suggested this well after tax return filing 
season was already underway, and with no real promise in sight as to the extent 
of corrections that may occur.93 In both cases, the combination of hyper-
partisanship and reconciliation to pass the original legislation, along with the 
inability to use reconciliation on the back-end to fix mistakes, left Congress 
surprisingly impotent to correct its own drafting mistakes. 
D. JUDICIAL AVERSION TO NON-CONGRESSIONAL FIXES 
Courts are typically willing to openly acknowledge they are correcting 
legislative drafting mistakes only in very narrow situations, in which there is a 
clear case of typographical error. For instance, in U.S. National Bank of Oregon, 
the Supreme Court was willing to correct what it believed to be an error in the 
placement of a quotation mark, explaining that “[a]gainst the overwhelming 
evidence from the structure, language, and subject matter of the 1916 Act 
there stands only the evidence from the Act’s punctuation, too weak to trump 
the rest.”94 When courts do correct these types of clear typographical errors, 
they often employ what is called the “scrivener’s error” doctrine. In dissent in 
X-Citement Video, Justice Scalia emphasized the narrowness of this doctrine, 
explaining that “the sine qua non of any ‘scrivener’s error’ doctrine . . . is that 
the meaning genuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be 
absolutely clear.”95 
Sometimes courts’ willingness to correct mistakes is dependent on the 
determination that failing to correct a mistake would lead to absurd 
outcomes, leading to a blurring of the “scrivener’s error doctrine” with the 
“absurdity doctrine.”96 For instance, in Bock Laundry, the Supreme Court 
examined a Federal Rule of Evidence that, if read verbatim, compelled 




[https://perma.cc/V9WZ-HLSS] (discussing the phenomenon of a minority party refusing to 
take part in fixing the legislative mistakes made by the majority, even before TCJA passage); 
Tankersley & Rappeport, supra note 83.   
 92. Jad Chamseddine, Technical Corrections Package Likely This Year, 164 TAX NOTES FED. 120, 
120 (2019) (quoting Democratic Ways and Means Chair saying that technical corrections are a 
“pressing matter,” after the most recent failed set of legislative fixes).  
 93. Id. 
 94. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 462 (1993).  
 95. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
see also Doerfler, supra note 16, at 828–34 (describing the narrowness of the judicial approach). 
 96. See Manning, supra note 16, at 2420 n.124 (noting that the two doctrines are sometimes 
linked); Adam N. Steinman, “Less” Is “More”? Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution to the 
Class Action Fairness Act’s Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1210 n.158 (2007) 
(same); see also The Honorable Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1614–15 (2012) (describing when 
absurdity doctrine and scrivener’s error doctrine do and do not overlap).  
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but not to civil plaintiffs.97 The majority rejected this “odd result,” arguing 
that the Federal Rule “can’t mean what it says.”98 Justice Scalia concurred on 
the basis that the statute, “if interpreted literally, produces an absurd, and 
perhaps unconstitutional, result.”99  
Recent cases have exhibited how courts’ own discomfort with fixing 
legislative drafting mistakes may leave very little leeway for courts to approve 
of agency fixes. First, in King, the case in which the Supreme Court decided 
the fate of the ACA in 2015,100 the Court displayed that, even when it might 
be willing to correct a mistake, it was not necessarily willing to do so openly. 
The ACA depended on a number of interlocking provisions, including the 
provision of tax credits to make insurance more affordable.101 In order for the 
statutory scheme to work, the tax credits had to be available to all eligible 
individuals whether they enrolled in insurance through a federal or state 
exchange.102 But the statute only authorized such credits for individuals who 
enrolled in insurance through an “[e]xchange established by the State.”103 It 
was pretty clear that this problematic language failed to carry out Congress’ 
intent but it was unclear whether the Court would be willing to treat the 
language as a mistake and, crucially, be willing to fix it.  
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, 
concluded that the best interpretation of the statute authorized tax credits for 
individuals who enrolled through an exchange established by states or by the 
federal government.104 In other words, the Court reached the conclusion that 
was consistent with the finding of a mistake. But in doing so, the Court 
assiduously avoided saying it was correcting a mistake.105 Rather, the Court 
relied on what many argued was a strained statutory interpretation to reach 
the same outcome.106 The Court also explicitly refused to delegate to the 
agency, the IRS (which had released a regulation correcting the arguable 
mistake), concluding that the extraordinarily important nature of the 
question indicated Congress had not intended to delegate it to the IRS.107  
 
 97. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509–10 (1989).  
 98. Id. at 509, 511 (quoting Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987)).   
 99. Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 100. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).  
 101. Id. at 2485.  
 102. Id. at 2494.  
 103. Id. at 2489 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012)). 
 104. Id. at 2488–96.  
 105. See id. The Court did acknowledge Congress’ “inartful drafting” of the ACA and the 
messy legislative process that had created it, but nonetheless did not address or dispose of the 
issue as a mistake. Id. at 2492.  
 106. See, e.g., Doerfler, supra note 16, at 843–58 (arguing that judicial disinclination to 
correct legislative drafting mistakes led to distorted argumentation and judicial decisions in King 
and other cases).  
 107. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–99.  
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The Court thus both simultaneously seemed to correct the mistake and 
to leave unsettled the continued treatment of legislative drafting mistakes. 
The fact that the Court reached so hard to avoid deciding the issue on the 
grounds of mistake suggested discomfort with openly correcting legislative 
drafting mistakes.108 The fact that the Court refused to defer to the IRS made 
even less clear when agencies could correct mistakes. And yet, the fact that 
the Court reached an outcome consistent with correcting Congress’ likely 
mistake suggested that perhaps the Court had opened the door on courts 
correcting legislative drafting mistakes, if only just a little.  
The Supreme Court has since signaled that King should not be read to 
open the door wider on courts correcting mistakes or allowing agencies to do 
so, at least in anything but an extraordinary case. In Digital Realty Trust v. 
Somers,109 the Court had to sort through the Dodd–Frank Act’s whistleblower 
and retaliation protection provisions. Somewhat curiously, the whistleblower 
definition under Dodd–Frank only included whistleblowers who report to the 
SEC (as opposed to reporting internally within an organization), though the 
retaliation provisions protected whistleblowers who reported internally.110 
This created somewhat of a statutory conundrum, whereby individuals were 
supposed to receive protection for reporting internally (which many 
employees are actually required to do prior to making any external reports), 
but they would not actually qualify as whistleblowers, and hence would not 
technically be eligible for such retaliation protections, unless they reported to 
the SEC.111 The oddity of the narrower whistleblower definition in light of the 
broader retaliation protections, and the seeming need for such broader 
protections in cases in which employees are required to report internally first, 
led the SEC to issue a broader regulation that included internal reporters as 
whistleblowers for the purposes of Dodd–Frank.112 Some courts of appeals 
upheld the SEC’s regulation,113 whereas the Fifth Circuit struck it down.114 
 
 108. The parties themselves did not brief the case as one of mistake. This likely reflected 
perceived discomfort with an issue so major turning on a doctrine of questionable application. 
Gluck, supra note 16, at 67 (describing the possibility of “a statutory mistake [as] the enormous 
elephant that neither party dared mention throughout the litigation”). 
 109. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 772–73 (2018).  
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6), (h) (2012). 
 111. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6); see also Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C., 801 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 
2015) (exploring how “there are categories of whistleblowers who cannot report wrongdoing to 
the Commission until after they have reported the wrongdoing to their employer”), abrogated by 
Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).  
 112. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(i)–(ii) (2012).  
 113. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d and 
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018); Berman, 801 F.3d at 155.  
 114. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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The nature of the case115 seemed, at least in the view of some, to place King’s 
legacy in play.116 
The Supreme Court unanimously found “the statute’s definition of 
‘whistleblower’ clear and conclusive” and thus struck down the SEC’s 
regulation as being in conflict with a clear statute.117 While there were 
certainly arguments that the statutory provision at issue in Somers was not, in 
fact, a mistake,118 the Court’s decision suggested that it generally did not 
intend to be in the business of looking too hard at statutes to determine 
whether a mistake existed, or defer to agencies that had. The Court 
emphasized that, as long as the language of the statute was clear, it was 
binding on both the agency and the Court,119 a discussion that sat at least a 
bit uncomfortably with King.120 Some commentators celebrated what they 
viewed as the Court’s retreat from an inclination to fix legislative drafting 
mistakes.121 For instance, Paul Mahoney expressed that the fact that King 
could now be understood as an anomaly “is all to the good” because “[t]he 
Court should refuse to play along when Congress cannot enact legislative 
language sufficient to achieve what it wants.”122 The upshot is that courts’ 
willingness to facilitate mistake correction has been quite limited. Courts are 
sometimes comfortable correcting fairly obvious typographical errors but are 
often wary of deferring to or approving of agencies’ attempts to correct 
legislative drafting mistakes. 
 
 115. See, e.g., Berman, 801 F.3d at 154 (noting that “[w]hen conferees are hastily trying to 
reconcile House and Senate bills, each of which number hundreds of pages, and someone 
succeeds in inserting a new provision like subdivision (iii) into subsection 21F(h)(1)(A), it is not 
at all surprising that no one noticed that the new subdivision and the definition of ‘whistleblower’ 
do not fit together neatly” (footnote omitted)).  
 116. See Somers, 850 F.3d at 1051 (Owens, J., dissenting) (“In my view, we should quarantine 
King and its potentially dangerous shapeshifting nature to the specific facts of that case to avoid 
jurisprudential disruption on a cellular level.”), rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018). The 
majority and dissenting opinions in the lower courts sparred over King. Compare, e.g., Berman, 801 
F.3d at 150, 155 (relying on King in the majority opinion), with id. at 159–60 (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he majority relies almost [exclusively] on [King],” but that King was 
motivated by “the upending of a ramified, hugely consequential enactment” and did not indicate 
a broader license to “cast aside [clear] statutory text”).  
 117. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 781–82 (2018).  
 118. See, e.g., id. at 777–78 (arguing that “Dodd–Frank’s purpose and design” were consistent 
with the Court’s reading of the statute).  
 119. Id. at 782 (“The statute’s unambiguous whistleblower definition, in short, precludes the 
Commission from more expansively interpreting that term.” (citation omitted)).  
 120. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 150 (“The interpretation issue facing the Supreme Court in King 
was far more problematic than the issue we face here.”).  
 121. See, e.g., Dan McLaughlin, The Supreme Court Proves It Didn’t Mean What It Said in King v. 
Burwell, NAT’L REV. (March 28, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/ 
supreme-court-king-v-burwell-decision-political [https://perma.cc/A6D8-72F5] (arguing that 
Somers revealed the truth about King: that it was politically motivated, rather than “a . . . sea change 
in” statutory interpretation). 
 122. Mahoney, supra note 16, at 590. 
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III. AGENCY LEGISLATIVE FIXES 
Despite the Court’s failure to endorse agency legislative fixes, agencies 
often do fix legislative drafting mistakes. This Part explores how agencies can 
create legislative fixes through the use of informal guidance and other tactics 
and offers an example and counterexample of this phenomenon through the 
most recent major legislation, the highly-flawed TCJA. These examples reveal 
underexplored features of agency legislative fixes, including post-legislative 
attempts by Congress to influence such fixes. 
A. THE DYNAMICS OF AGENCY LEGISLATIVE FIXES 
When an agency becomes responsible for implementing flawed 
legislation, Congress members have both formal and informal means of 
influencing the agency’s implementation. First, Congress has formal channels 
of control over agencies including appropriations power, the ability to require 
agency reporting, conducting congressional investigations, the ability to 
confirm high-level officials, and the like.123 These formal mechanisms of 
control are paired with less studied, but perhaps equally important, informal 
mechanisms such as backchannel contacts between Congress members and 
agency officials.124 Additionally, congressional staffers may also participate in 
the administrative process to ensure administrative guidance reflects the 
intent of those who passed the legislation. For instance, House Ways and 
Means staffers acknowledged working with Treasury in crafting its post-TCJA 
guidance.125 
 
 123. For foundational work on congressional control of agency policy outcomes, see 
generally Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas 
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 
(1984); and Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 
(1989). For some more recent work, see generally CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34354, CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE ON RULEMAKING AND REGULATION THROUGH 
APPROPRIATIONS RESTRICTIONS (2008), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34354.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P8BN-V4YU] (detailing Congress’ methods for influencing agency 
regulatory activity); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 
(2006) (drawing on political science literature to detail Congress’ deep involvement in the 
administration of the law); and Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the 
Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463 (2015) (fleshing out how individual members of 
Congress can influence agency exercises of discretion). 
 124. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 10 (1994) (explaining that legislators intervene in the administrative process 
on behalf of specific constituencies, often “behind the scenes”); Rao, supra note 123, at 1482–83 
(discussing such informal controls and citing example of Senator Warren’s informal control over 
the CFPB as well as the practice of Representative Dingell issuing letters seeking information 
—“colloquially . . . referred to as ‘Dingell-grams’”—to agencies). 
 125. David van den Berg, ABA Section of Taxation Meeting: Ways and Means Still Assisting 
Treasury with TCJA Guidance, 159 TAX NOTES 1246, 1246 (2018). 
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Notwithstanding Congress members’ (or their staffers’) and agency 
officials’ coordinated efforts, agencies face obstacles when the correct 
implementation, according to Congress members or agency officials, would 
be inconsistent with the text of the statute. Namely, to the extent that an 
agency provides guidance inconsistent with the statute, if the guidance 
disadvantages a constituency with standing to sue, the agency risks its action 
being invalidated by courts under the judicial approaches discussed above.126 
Agencies can get around this difficulty. If agencies issue guidance that 
benefits regulated parties, there may not be anyone with both the incentive 
and standing to sue the agency. Regulated parties who benefit from the 
guidance generally will not have the incentive to sue.127 And, because of the 
way standing rules work, other parties that are not directly regulated by the 
legislation, but rather only stand to benefit indirectly, generally do not have 
standing to sue for the agency’s failure to implement the legislation.128 
Moreover, if the agency avoids issuing the guidance in official regulations, 
instead opting for less formal guidance (such as notices, press releases, and 
the like), the agency makes it even less likely that anyone will be able to sue, 
as such guidance often fails to meet judicial “ripeness” requirements.129 Thus, 
through informal guidance that benefits regulated parties, agency officials 
may fix legislative drafting mistakes.130 
 
 126. See supra Section II.D. It is also possible that agency guidance that conflicts with the 
statute may be disallowed during centralized executive review. See infra text accompanying note 
304 for discussion of the potential role of OIRA with respect to agency legislative fixes.  
 127. Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV. 73, 108 (2015); 
Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 
829, 848–50 (2012). 
 128. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short 
Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 308–09 (2010) (examining difficulties for regulatory beneficiaries); Nina 
A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 
420–24 (2007) (same); Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance 
Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 344 (2011) (same). 
 129. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967) (“Without undertaking 
to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine it is fair to say that its basic rationale is to prevent 
the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract 
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial 
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete 
way by the challenging parties.” (footnote omitted)), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 
(1977); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 320 F.3d 272, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that the 
EPA’s interpretation in its manual does not create any imminent or redressable injury); 
Aulenback, Inc. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 103 F.3d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that the 
Federal Highway Administration training manual which was arguably inconsistent with a statute 
was not ripe for review); Greve & Parrish, supra note 16, at 532 (discussing how agencies’ turn to 
guidance documents avoids judicial review); Seidenfeld, supra note 128, at 376–85 (discussing 
ripeness issues generally, as well as the related judicial doctrine of finality). 
 130. See, e.g., Greve & Parrish, supra note 16, at 512 (“A Congress that enacts massive statutes 
under frantic conditions is bound to make mistakes—and unlikely to correct them after the fact. 
Against this backdrop, even ordinarily cautious agencies may resort to de facto rewrites and exotic 
canons, at least so long as the litigation risks are minimal.”). 
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B. APPLYING THE DYNAMICS 
The TCJA, the most recent major tax legislation and the largest overhaul 
of the tax system in over 30 years,131 provides numerous recent examples of 
how these dynamics play out. Due to a variety of legislative irregularities in the 
passage of the TCJA, including the incredible speed at which it was pushed 
through Congress, the TCJA contained numerous legislative drafting 
mistakes.132 Yet, Congress and the public placed immense pressure on the 
implementing agency, the Treasury Department (accompanied by the IRS), 
to ensure taxpayers could apply the new tax law.133  
The IRS resolved this dilemma in some cases by providing agency 
legislative fixes. One such agency legislative fix addressed sexual abuse 
attorney fees.134 The TCJA included a provision, informally referred to as the 
“Weinstein tax,”135 which disallowed deductions for “(1) any settlement or 
payment related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse if such settlement or 
payment is subject to a nondisclosure agreement, or (2) attorney’s fees 
related to such a settlement or payment.”136 Democratic Senator Menendez 
had originally proposed this addition to the TCJA as a way to ensure that 
businesses could not deduct hush money paid to cover up sexual abuse.137 
However, when tax law drafters translated this conceptual proposal into 
legislative language,138 they inadvertently broadened its scope (including by 
 
 131. Mike DeBonis & Erica Werner, How Republicans Pulled Off the Biggest Tax Overhaul in 30 
Years, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2017, 12:20 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
economy/how-the-republicans-pulled-off-the-biggest-tax-overhaul-in-30-years/2017/12/20/ 
efcba3c4-e54e-11e7-ab50-621fe0588340_story.html [https://perma.cc/YY8D-3KTF]. 
 132. Indeed, in its post-legislation description of the TCJA, known widely as its “Bluebook,” 
the JCT identified over 70 instances in which technical corrections may be needed for the TCJA. 
See supra note 89 (commenting on the greater than usual number of mistakes in the TCJA). See 
generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC 
LAW 115-97 (J. Comm. Print 2018) (identifying numerous opportunities for technical corrections 
throughout the Act).  
 133. See, e.g., William Hoffman, TCJA Reg Writers Earn Tax Notes’ 2018 Person of the Year, 161 
TAX NOTES 1409, 1409 (2018) (describing enormous pressure on Treasury and IRS in the year 
after the legislation’s passage to ensure its administrability).  
 134. As will be described in the text, the provision addresses deductions for payments related 
to sexual harassment or sexual abuse. For ease of exposition, the issue will be referred under the 
umbrella “sexual abuse” term. 
 135. See Robert W. Wood, Ironically, Weinstein Tax on Sexual Harassment Settlements May Hurt 
Plaintiffs Too, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2018, 8:51 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/ 
2018/01/03/ironically-weinstein-tax-on-sexual-harassment-settlements-may-hurt-plaintiffs-too 
[https://perma.cc/V58V-ZPR8].  
 136. I.R.C. § 162(q) (2018).  
 137. Menendez Calls on GOP to Fix Its Tax Bill to Protect Victims of Workplace Sexual Misconduct, 
BOB MENENDEZ FOR N.J. (Dec. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Menendez News Release], https:// 
www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-calls-on-gop-to-fix-its-tax-bill-to-
protect-victims-of-workplace-sexual-misconduct- [https://perma.cc/YB6W-MRX6].  
 138. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 940 
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adding an overly broad cross-reference to “this chapter,” which referenced 
not only business, but also individual, deductions).139 This seemingly 
innocuous drafting mistake had significant consequences. It seemed to 
prevent not only businesses, but also sexual abuse victims, from deducting 
attorney fees they pay with respect to sexual abuse settlements.140 Senator 
Menendez quickly acknowledged a drafting mistake had been made, 
criticizing Republicans for the “outrageous and maddening” result, which 
“inevitably can occur when members are forced to vote on haphazardly 
rushed legislation before even getting a chance to read it.”141 
Congress made various efforts in the aftermath of the passage of the TCJA 
to fix the mistake, but ultimately lacked the ability to do so. In December 
2018, the Republican-led House of Representatives passed the Retirement, 
Savings, and Other Tax Relief Act of 2018, which principally addressed other 
issues but included a number of technical fixes to the TCJA, including the 
sexual abuse attorney fees mistake.142 That legislation failed to advance 
through the full Congress as a result of Democratic opposition to various 
provisions as well as the cost of the legislation.143 Republican representative 
Kevin Brady, then-Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, then 
introduced a discussion draft of the Tax Technical and Clerical Corrections 
Act.144 The proposed legislation would have, among many other fixes, limited 
the new sexual abuse provision only to business deductions, which would have 
eliminated the unintended limitation for sexual abuse victims.145 However, 
none of the proposed technical corrections progressed under Brady’s tenure, 
even though Democratic and Republican lawmakers seemed to be in 
 
(2013) (exploring how Congress members are involved in legislation at the conceptual level, 
whereas professional drafters actually craft legislation); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 26, at 585 
–86 (same). See generally Oei & Osofsky, supra note 26 (examining the conceptual/drafting divide 
in the tax context).   
 139. Kristen A. Parillo, IRS Clarifies TCJA’s Sexual Harassment Provision, 162 TAX NOTES 1255, 
1255 (2019); Menendez News Release, supra note 137.  
 140. See, e.g., Ryan Sit, Republican Tax Bill Will Hurt Sexual Harassment Victims, Experts Say, 
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 20, 2017, 3:58 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/tax-bill-metoo-sexual-
harassment-deduction-hush-money-754322 [https://perma.cc/SW6W-PVF7].  
 141. Menendez News Release, supra note 137.  
 142. Retirement, Savings, and Other Tax Relief Act of 2018, H.R. 88, 115th Cong. § 501(d) 
(2018).  
 143. Ted Godbout, House Attempts ‘Hail Mary’ with Tax, Retirement Legislation, NAT’L ASS’N 
PLAN ADVISORS (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.napa-net.org/news-info/daily-news/house-
attempts-%E2%80%98hail-mary%E2%80%99-tax-retirement-legislation [https://perma.cc/ 
8W8F-VHD3].  
 144. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., 115TH CONG., 2D SESSION, TAX TECHNICAL AND 
CLERICAL CORRECTIONS ACT DISCUSSION DRAFT, (Jan. 2, 2019), available at https://republicans-
waysandmeansforms.house.gov/uploadedfiles/tax_technical_and_clerical_corrections_act_disc
ussion_draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/AA4F-5YK6].  
 145. Id. § 4(r); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION 
OF THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM. CHAIRMAN’S DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE “TAX TECHNICAL 
AND CLERICAL CORRECTIONS ACT” 9 (Comm. Print 2019). 
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agreement that a mistake had been made, and bi-partisan support existed to 
change the legislation.146 Senator Menendez also moved forward on his own, 
introducing the “Repeal the Trump Tax Hike on Victims of Sexual 
Harassment Act of 2018.”147 This proposal faltered as well.  
These legislative failures left Treasury in a real bind. It was clear that 
Congress did not intend for sexual abuse victims to lose the ability to deduct 
attorney fees for settlements they received, as underscored by Congress’ 
efforts to fix the mistake in the aftermath of legislative passage. Yet, the text 
of the legislation that was passed also seemed clear: It explicitly disallowed 
“attorney’s fees related” to specified sexual abuse settlements under the 
income tax code “chapter,” which included the deduction otherwise available 
for victims’ attorney fees. In other words, it was perfectly clear that Congress 
had not intended the result that it had created, and that Congress nonetheless 
seemed, at least at present, unable to fix it. And the clock was ticking—tax 
return filing season for 2018 (the first year in which the TCJA was in effect) 
was beginning. The question was: Would the IRS abide by what the text of the 
law seemed to require? Or would the IRS deviate from it? If the IRS deviated 
from the text, would it tell the public in advance?  
On February 28, 2019, just as tax return filing season was about to kick 
into high gear, the IRS answered this question in the form of an “FAQ” on its 
website. The IRS’ FAQ asked, “Does section 162(q) preclude me from 
deducting my attorney’s fees related to the settlement of my sexual 
harassment claim if the settlement is subject to a nondisclosure 
agreement?”148 The IRS answered:  
No, recipients of settlements or payments related to sexual 
harassment or sexual abuse, whose settlement or payment is subject 
to a nondisclosure agreement, are not precluded by section 162(q) 
from deducting attorney’s fees related to the settlement or payment, 
if otherwise deductible. See Publication 525, Taxable and 
Nontaxable Income, for additional information on when all or a 
portion of attorney’s fees may be deductible.149 
And, simple as that, the IRS resolved the issue with a few short sentences. 
No muss. No fuss. This was the answer everyone knew accomplished what 
Congress had intended. It settled the matter for sexual abuse victims, who 
could now deduct their attorney fees without concern. And it would allow the 
IRS to administer the tax system without having to worry about its agents 
 
 146. See, e.g., Parillo, supra note 139, at 1255–56 (discussing efforts by Congress members on 
both sides of the aisle to fix the mistake).   
 147. S. 2820, 115th Cong. (2018).  
 148. Section 162(q) FAQ, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/section-162q-faq [https:// 
perma.cc/DLQ8-43RJ] (last updated Jan. 17, 2020). 
 149. Id.  
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taking different positions in auditing taxpayers’ returns. For all these reasons, 
one could reasonably argue that the IRS had taken the only sensible path. 
But the reasonableness of the IRS’ actions did not diminish the hubris 
that had accompanied it. Powerful Republican and Democratic 
representatives alike (including Senate Finance Committee Member Senator 
Menendez and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Brady) tried to 
make this correction and yet lacked the ability to muster enough votes. In 
their stead, the IRS, an unelected agency, simply fixed the problem on its own 
through an “FAQ” on its website, an informal communication that lacked any 
status or process as a form of law.  
In taking this tack, the IRS adopted a particularly notable, but also 
paradigmatic, agency legislative fix. Here, as elsewhere,150 the IRS used 
informal guidance, which, as a practical matter, no one could challenge,151 to 
fix a legislative drafting mistake in a way Congress could not, and in a way that 
was likely to be disapproved of by courts, had they had a chance to review the 
action.  
While the IRS was willing to make a fix in some cases, it was not willing to 
do so in others. A good counterexample occurred with respect to qualified 
improvement property. This mistake arose out of very detailed changes that 
Congress made to the rules regarding the depreciation of property in the 
TCJA. Prior to the TCJA, various classes of “improvement property” were 
eligible for depreciation over a relatively short time period. As one of the 
housekeeping changes in the TCJA, Congress consolidated the various types 
of “improvement property” into one category—“qualified improvement 
property.”152 Congress had meant for such qualified improvement property 
to retain its prior, favorable depreciation designation, which, under the new 
TCJA rules, would also make it eligible for an even more favorable provision 
—bonus depreciation.153 However, in what was widely acknowledged by 
Congress members and commentators to be a drafting mistake, the TCJA 
drafters failed to include cross-references to the newly consolidated qualified 
improvement property category in the appropriate places in the depreciation 
 
 150. The examples offered here are emblematic of a broader set of decisions. For instance, 
as suggested in the text accompanying notes 78–81, another TCJA legislative drafting mistake 
involved creating a new tax credit for qualifying relatives but simultaneously rendering it 
inoperable. In the case of the new qualifying relatives tax credit, Treasury released a notice 
indicating that the reduction of the zero-exemption amount shall not be taken into account for 
defining a qualifying relative. I.R.S. Notice 2018-70, 2018-38 I.R.B. 441, available at https:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-38.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X3U-ZFUF]. 
 151. Sexual abuse victims would not challenge the IRS’ position because it advantaged them. 
And no one else would have standing to challenge the application of the rule.  
 152. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13204(a)(6), 131 Stat. 2054, 2110–11 
(2017).  
 153. See, e.g., Nathan J. Richman, ABA Section of Taxation Meeting: Qualified Improvement Property 
Ripe for Technical Correction Fix, 159 TAX NOTES 1236, 1236 (2018).  
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rules.154 The unintended result was that qualified improvement property 
would be ineligible for the new bonus depreciation, and, even worse, it would 
actually be subject to depreciation over a much longer period of time than 
had been the case under the depreciation rules that preceded the TCJA.155 
Shortly after the TCJA passed, the qualified improvement property 
mistake was widely identified as such, often grouped with the sexual abuse 
attorney fees mistake in this regard. Interest groups came out in droves, 
arguing that the qualified improvement property treatment in the TCJA was 
a mistake that should be fixed.156 Various government officials affirmed that, 
like with sexual abuse attorney fees, Congress made a mistake for qualified 
improvement property.157 For instance, a JCT legislation tax accountant 
explained that the final draft of the qualified improvement provision did not 
reflect the conference agreement.158  
A delicate dance began regarding the possibility of a qualified 
improvement property fix. Treasury moved first by issuing proposed 
regulations on the new depreciation rules, which did not correct the 
legislative drafting error that had been made.159 In reaction, the Senate 
Finance Committee Republicans who had enacted the TCJA wrote a letter to 
Treasury and the IRS in order to “clarify the congressional intent of this 
recently enacted tax legislation.”160 The letter fleshed out various instances, 
including both the qualified improvement property mistake and the sexual 
abuse attorney fee mistake, in which, at least according to the Senate Finance 
Committee Republicans, drafting mistakes had thwarted Congress’ intent.161 
 
 154. See, e.g., id. (explaining that “[t]here is broad agreement that qualified improvement 
property was excluded from bonus depreciation because of a drafting error”).  
 155. See id. 
 156. See, e.g., David van den Berg, Coalition of Companies and Groups Seeks Technical Fixes for 
TCJA, 159 TAX NOTES 1667, 1667–68 (2018) (pointing to various constituencies seeking 
correction).  
 157. See, e.g., Richman, supra note 153, at 1236. 
 158. Id.  
 159. 83 Fed. Reg. 39,292, 39,293 (Aug. 8, 2018). Since the effective date of the TCJA’s new 
depreciation rules applied to property placed in service after December 31, 2017, Treasury was 
able to preserve the former, more favorable treatment for qualified improvement property for 
property placed in service prior to January 1, 2018. Id. 
 160. Finance Committee Republicans Clarify Intent of 3 TCJA Sections, TAX NOTES TODAY (Aug. 16, 
2018) [hereinafter Finance Committee Republicans], https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/ 
depreciation-amortization-and-depletion/finance-committee-republicans-clarify-intent-3-tcja-
sections/2018/08/17/28bxz [https://perma.cc/DKP4-WW3C]. This was far from the only time 
that Congress had sent such a letter in an effort to get an agency legislative fix. See, e.g., Income 
Attributable to Domestic Production Activities, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,220, 67,222 (Nov. 4, 2005) 
(letter to the Secretary of the Treasury from the House Ways and Means Chair, the Senate 
Finance Committee Chair, and the Senate Finance Committee ranking member providing 
clarification of congressional intent “so that appropriate regulatory guidance may be issued 
reflecting [their] intention”).  
 161. Finance Committee Republicans, supra note 160. 
A4_OSOFSKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/2020  8:41 AM 
2020] AGENCY LEGISLATIVE FIXES 2135 
The letter also pointed to legislative history in support of its claims.162 The 
Treasury Department demurred, responding that, while the letter from the 
Senate Finance Republicans was “welcome,” it “may not be enough” to get to 
an administrative solution to the problems and that, more generally, Treasury 
was still talking to Capitol Hill about the potential options.163 An IRS branch 
chief in the Office of Associate Chief Counsel explained that the agency 
typically looks for statements of intent from the “four horsemen—the chairs 
and ranking members of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means 
committees,” and that the IRS was thus waiting to see if any statement came 
from House Ways and Means.164 Sixteen Senate Democrats got in on the act, 
writing a subsequent letter to Treasury arguing that, in light of the fact that a 
drafting mistake was clearly made, as reflected in the legislative history and 
the assumption of the more favorable depreciation rules that went into the 
Joint Committee’s scoring of the legislation,165 it would be “prudent for 
Treasury to address this issue and its interpretation through guidance.”166  
Unlike with the sexual abuse attorney fees mistake, Treasury ultimately 
declined to make an administrative fix for the qualified improvement 
property mistake. A tax policy advisor in the Treasury Office of Tax Legislative 
Counsel stated that, “We’ve considered what authority we may have . . . and I 
think we have come to the point now where we need a technical 
correction.”167 In other words, it was Congress or bust.  
Subsequent to Treasury’s indication that it would not fix the qualified 
improvement property mistake, Congress attempted to do so. Like with the 
sexual abuse attorney fee mistake, the House’s Retirement, Savings, and 
Other Tax Relief Act of 2018 contained a proposed fix for qualified 
improvement property,168 as did Representative Brady’s discussion draft of the 
 
 162. Id.  
 163. Nathan J. Richman, Regulators Anticipate Legislative Changes to Bonus Depreciation, 160 TAX 
NOTES 1304, 1304 (2018). 
 164. Id.  
 165. Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: The CBO 
Canon and Other Ways that Courts Can Improve on What They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 177, 187–91 (2017) (suggesting “that an ambiguous statut[ory provision] should be 
[interpreted] in [a manner consistent] with the . . . ‘budget score’”).   
 166. Senators Look to Treasury for TCJA Depreciation Fix, TAX NOTES TODAY (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/depreciation-amortization-and-depletion/ 
senators-look-treasury-tcja-depreciation-fix/2018/10/03/28h0s?highlight=Senators%20Look 
%20to%20Treasury%20for%20TCJA%20Depreciation [https://perma.cc/V4MR-Z4F4].  
 167. Nathan J. Richman, Treasury: Qualified Improvement Property Needs Technical Correction, TAX 




 168. Retirement, Savings, and Other Tax Relief Act of 2018, H.R. 88, 115th Cong. § 501(b) 
(2018).  
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Tax Technical and Clerical Corrections Act.169 Because Treasury refused to 
fix the mistake in the qualified improvement property context, the 
congressional efforts also continued in a variety of fashions. For instance, in 
March 2019, a bipartisan pair of senators joined to introduce yet another bill 
to fix the qualified improvement property mistake,170 an effort that was 
followed by a bipartisan House bill designed to do the same thing.171 But, 
while hope remained that Congress would eventually fix the qualified 
improvement property mistake, it was not done in a timely fashion—the 2018 
tax filing season was well underway without a fix in sight.172  
C. CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING AGENCY ACTION AND INACTION IN  
RESPONSE TO THE TCJA 
There were striking similarities between the sexual abuse attorney fee 
mistake and the qualified improvement property mistake. Both resulted from 
a failed cross-reference,173 an easy mistake to make in the rush of frenzied 
legislative passage. In both cases, members of Congress as well as other 
commentators came out shortly after the passage of the legislation to identify 
the mistake. Indeed, Congress and members of the public often mentioned 
the two mistakes in the same breath as glaring errors that had been made in 
the TCJA.174 In both cases, members of Congress tried to fix the mistake in 
time for the first tax return filing season affected by the TCJA but failed to do 
so. And, in both cases, all these factors joined together to put pressure on 
Treasury to fix the problem. But, while the IRS fixed the sexual abuse attorney 
fee mistake, neither Treasury nor the IRS were willing to do so for qualified 
improvement property, at least not in time for filing season.  
 
 169. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., 115TH CONG., 2D SESSION, TAX TECHNICAL AND 
CLERICAL CORRECTIONS ACT DISCUSSION DRAFT, (Jan. 2, 2019), available at https://republicans-
waysandmeansforms.house.gov/uploadedfiles/tax_technical_and_clerical_corrections_act_disc
ussion_draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/AA4F-5YK6].  
 170. Restoring Investment in Improvements Act, S. 803, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019).  
 171. Restoring Investment in Improvements Act, H.R. 1689, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019).  
 172. See Foster, supra note 91, at 146 (suggesting that changes may not come until Congress 
has to pass must-pass legislation such as legislation addressing the debt ceiling and even reporting 
that TCJA technical corrections may eventually be made only in exchange for still-unmade 
technical corrections for the ACA). These prognostications ended up being right. As this Article 
went to press in the spring of 2020, Congress finally passed the qualified improvement property 
fix as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act. CARES Act, S. 
3548, 116th Cong. § 2207 (2020).   
 173. While the too-broad cross-reference to “this chapter” in § 162(q) created the problem 
in the case of the sexual abuse provision, it could be corrected in a number of ways including, for 
instance, adding a narrowing clause to the provision addressing attorney fees. See, e.g., HOUSE 
WAYS AND MEANS COMM., 115TH CONG., 2D SESSION, TAX TECHNICAL AND CLERICAL CORRECTIONS 
ACT DISCUSSION DRAFT (adopting such an approach). 
 174. The August 16th, 2018 letter from Republicans on the Senate Finance Committee 
identified qualified improvement property and sexual abuse lawyer fees as two of the three issues 
in need of technical corrections. Finance Committee Republicans, supra note 160.  
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So, what explains the agency’s willingness to step in and fix Congress’ 
legislative drafting mistake in the case of sexual abuse attorney fees but not 
for qualified improvement property? The short answer is that the answer 
simply is not clear. In this case, as in others, the lack of any systematic or 
transparent process for making and communicating decisions about agency 
legislative fixes created uncertainty about what motivated the agency’s 
decisions. However, some possible hypotheses are discussed below.  
1. The Statute 
One possibility is that the statute dictated the different outcomes in the 
different cases. If this were true, there would be nothing that remarkable 
about Treasury making the fix in the former case but not the latter. Treasury 
would just be making fixes only when permitted by the statute.  
This is certainly possible. Tellingly, in explaining why Treasury had 
refused to reach an agency legislative fix for qualified improvement property, 
an IRS associate chief counsel lamented that, despite the bad result, “there’s 
no authority for us, administratively, to step in and override the clear language 
of the statute.”175 Seemingly, under the statute, the failure to cross-reference 
the new qualified improvement property category as one of the types of 
property that would be eligible for more favorable depreciation rules left the 
new category subject to the default, undesirable treatment applicable to 
nonresidential real property.176 In contrast, the statutory prohibition on 
deducting “attorney’s fees related to [any settlement or payment related to 
sexual harassment or sexual abuse]” had some slight looseness in the statutory 
language, including the “related to” phrase, which may have given Treasury 
some interpretive space to make a fix. 
But it also is not entirely clear that the statute provided Treasury 
substantially more wiggle room to make the fix in the case of the sexual abuse 
attorney fees. As described previously, notwithstanding the “related to” 
language, the sexual abuse provision seemed to broadly disallow deductions 
for attorney fees even for sexual abuse victims.177 In any event, the IRS, in its 
FAQs, used the exact same “related to” language to seemingly inexplicably 
reach the exact opposite conclusion of the statute. The IRS explained that 
“recipients of settlements or payments related to sexual harassment or sexual 
abuse, whose settlement or payment is subject to a nondisclosure agreement, 
are not precluded by section 162(q) from deducting attorney’s fees related to 
the settlement or payment, if otherwise deductible.”178 In using the exact same 
language of the statute but reaching the opposite conclusion, the IRS did not 
 
 175. Richman, supra note 167.   
 176. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168(c) (2018) (listing nonresidential real property as having a recovery 
period of 39 years, a default applicable to qualified improvement property absent its inclusion in 
some other class of property).  
 177. See supra notes 135–41. 
 178. Section 162(q) FAQ, supra note 148 (emphasis added).  
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seem to be relying on statutory looseness. Rather, the IRS simply seemed to 
be setting the statute aside to reach a different result. 
Moreover, there are arguments that a qualified improvement property 
fix would have been consistent with the statute. Specifically, the reason why 
qualified improvement property seems to be ineligible for a shorter 
depreciation schedule and bonus depreciation is because it is not explicitly 
listed as falling in a category of property that is eligible for a shorter 
depreciation period. As a result, it would appear, by default, to fall into the 
category of “nonresidential real property,” which is listed as having a longer, 
39-year recovery period, making it ineligible for bonus depreciation.179 But, 
one could argue that, by creating a defined category of “qualified 
improvement property” separate and apart from “nonresidential real 
property,” Congress implicitly indicated that the new category should not just 
be treated as nonresidential real property by default.180 If interpreted this way, 
the statute simply does not specify the recovery period for qualified 
improvement property, perhaps opening the door to Treasury answering the 
question through the use of legislative history, which may enable a fix. 
In any event, whether the differences in statutory language explain why 
the agency treated these two situations differently or not, the IRS did not 
openly say so. Rather, in its website FAQs, the IRS just asserted that sexual 
abuse victims could deduct attorney fees. The IRS never defended this 
decision publicly or subjected it, or its criteria generally, to transparent 
explanation. 
2. Legislative History 
Even if the statute did not dictate the different treatments, the legislative 
history might. Depending on one’s method of interpretation, legislative 
history can be an important interpretive tool, and agencies may look to 
legislative history to provide support for an interpretation that would 
otherwise appear to conflict with the statute.181  
However, this factor was not determinative in the case of the two TCJA 
examples. There was essentially no legislative history regarding the TCJA’s 
addition of the new sexual abuse deduction limitation.182 In contrast, the 
legislative history regarding qualified improvement property clearly 
 
 179. I.R.C. § 168(c). 
 180. See, e.g., id. § 168(b)(3) (listing separately nonresidential real property and qualified 
improvement property as categories of property to which the straight line method of depreciation 
applies).  
 181. See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, supra note 138, at 972 (examining Congress’ use of 
legislative history as a means of influencing agency implementation of statutes); Christopher J. 
Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1034–48 (2015) (examining 
agency use of legislative history).  
 182. The conference committee report simply describes, almost verbatim, the legislative 
provision and then notes that “[t]he conference agreement follows the Senate amendment.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 115-466, at 431 (2017) (Conf. Rep.).  
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supported the conclusion that an inadvertent drafting mistake had been 
made. The conference committee report for the TCJA had (incorrectly) 
asserted that qualified improvement property was subject to a 15-year recovery 
period.183 The Joint Explanatory Statement of the conference committee 
released in conjunction with the TCJA also asserted that the now consolidated 
category of qualified improvement property had a 15-year recovery period.184 
The IRS’ willingness to fix the sexual abuse attorney fee mistake, but not the 
qualified improvement property mistake, indicates that while legislative 
history may matter in some cases, it is far from the only explanatory factor. 
Moreover, the qualified improvement property example indicates that, even 
when the legislative history shows the drafters made a mistake, an agency may 
not be willing to fix it.  
3. More Practical Considerations 
If statutory language and legislative history alone may not explain an 
agency’s decisions, what other factors may serve as motivators? A variety of 
more practical factors are also likely to matter.  
i. Procedural Options for Making a Fix 
One possibility is that procedural options for making a fix serve as a 
factor. The IRS likely found it easier to make an agency legislative fix in the 
case of the sexual abuse attorney fees because the IRS was able to make the 
fix in this case in the form of frequently asked questions (“FAQs”) on its 
website.185 Such FAQs have no formal status as or place in the law. Since they 
are not officially binding on anyone, no party would be in a position to 
challenge them.186 In contrast, Treasury had to provide guidance about the 
new depreciation and expensing regime in officially-issued regulations 
because of the complexity of the depreciation and expensing rules and the 
extensive changes the TCJA made to them. Notwithstanding the fact that few 
would have standing to challenge taxpayer-favorable regulations, such 
regulations constitute a substantial regulatory action that still must go 
through extensive internal and external procedures. These include the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) review and the notice-and-
comment process. Treasury would be hard-pressed to defend positions 
inconsistent with the statute in such procedural spaces. 
 
 183. Id. at 366–67.  
 184. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE TO H.R. 1, “TAX 
CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 205 (Dec. 2017), available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/ 
20171218/JointExplanatoryStatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z4R-4U73].  
 185. See Section 162(q) FAQ, supra note 148 (answering the frequently asked question of 
whether “section 162(q) preclude[s] me from deducting my attorney’s fees related to the 
settlement of my sexual harassment claim if the settlement is subject to a nondisclosure 
agreement”).  
 186. See cases cited supra note 129.  
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ii. Informal Dialogue with Congress 
The examples from the TCJA reveal another factor in considering an 
agency legislative fix: informal dialogue with members of Congress after 
legislative passage. In the case of both mistakes, Congress members from both 
sides of the aisle reached out to encourage an agency legislative fix. There 
were clearly internal norms that helped shape the communications, although 
such norms have no formal place in the law. For instance, the IRS branch 
chief’s explanation that the agency typically looks for statements of intent 
from the “four horsemen—the chairs and ranking members of the Senate 
Finance and House Ways and Means committees,” and that the IRS was thus 
waiting to see if any statement came from House Ways and Means,187 has no 
place in formal law. According to clearly established precedent, only Congress 
can make law as a body, through the formal procedures of bicameralism and 
presentment.188 From this perspective, it is unclear why it would matter 
whether the four horsemen issued a letter indicating their agreement that a 
legislative drafting mistake had been made. If Congress believes a legislative 
drafting mistake has been made, Congress’ recourse, as a formal matter, 
would be to issue corrective legislation.  
But this dialogue nonetheless matters in the context of agency legislative 
fixes. Marc Gerson, former majority tax counsel to the House Ways and Means 
Committee, described in a rare article about the subject how staff within 
Congress, Congress members themselves, and Treasury and IRS officials work 
closely together to determine how to address legislative drafting problems.189 
These actors negotiate carefully over whether the agency may address the 
issue through administrative guidance, rather than requiring Congress to 
actually pass corrective legislation in the form of a technical correction.190 For 
this reason, taxpayers and their advisors often first look to Treasury and the 
IRS to see what legislative problems can be fixed administratively before 
looking to Congress.191 While this path would seem to be backwards, 
considering Congress’ constitutional role in passing and correcting 
 
 187. Nathan J. Richman, GOP Taxwriters Ask Treasury to Accommodate 3 Technical Corrections, 
160 TAX NOTES 1161, 1161 (2018) [hereinafter Richman, GOP Taxwriters]; Nathan J. Richman, 
Practitioners See More Qualified Improvement Property Fix Options, 160 TAX NOTES 1618, 1618 (2018) 
[hereinafter Richman, Practitioners]. 
 188. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
 189. Gerson, supra note 81, at 931. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Michael Cohn, Congressional Staff Aims to Finish Technical Corrections to Tax Reform  
Bill, ACCT. TODAY (Apr. 25, 2018, 5:53 PM), https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/ 
congressional-staff-aims-to-finish-technical-corrections-to-tax-reform-bill [https://perma.cc/ 
N7A8-CHK6] (“[M]any taxpayers are awaiting guidance from the Treasury Department and the 
Internal Revenue Service while a technical corrections bill is being prepared.”).  
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legislation,192 it reflects the reality of agency legislative fixes and the informal 
dialogue with Congress that can motivate them.  
iii. Public Opinion and Other Factors 
Other practical factors surely help explain the agency’s decisions about 
whether to correct mistakes. For instance, commentators suggested that 
Congress, JCT, and Treasury all have to have a meeting of the minds in order 
to pass a technical corrections bill.193 It is unclear why Treasury, for instance, 
would have a say in whether a technical corrections bill could pass, a question 
that would seem to lie solely with Congress. Perhaps the dialogue running 
from the agency to Congress about the likelihood of reaching a technical 
corrections solution in Congress may also motivate an agency’s decision about 
whether to try to reach a solution in the administrative context. In this regard, 
perhaps the fact that Congress tried and failed to reach a resolution on the 
sexual abuse attorney fees issue prior to Treasury acting at all encouraged 
Treasury to resolve it. In contrast, Treasury became relatively locked into its 
position that it would not resolve the qualified improvement property mistake 
prior to Congress indicating that it would not act either.   
Public opinion likely also played a role in motivating the agency 
legislative fix in the case of the sexual abuse drafting mistake. Increased 
attention to sexual abuse and a desire to support victims motivated Congress’ 
change in the law.194 As a policy matter, it would make little sense for the IRS 
to enforce a new rule that denies victims a deduction for attorney fees, thus 
accomplishing exactly the opposite of Congress’ goals.195 Moreover, asking 
the IRS to be the agency that does this is doubly troubling. The IRS is an 
agency already perpetually struggling for public support.196 The public is 
unlikely to understand (or at least fully accept) that the IRS, the public face 
of the tax law, is bound by a mistaken cross-reference in a statute.197 Asking 
the IRS to be the public face of a mistaken change in the law that would be 
 
 192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).  
 193. Cooper, supra note 29, at 1162. 
 194. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Where #MeToo Came from, and Where It’s Going: The 
Movement Is Moving the Culture Beneath the Law of Sexual Abuse, ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/catharine-mackinnon-what-metoo-has-
changed/585313 [https://perma.cc/KJ4N-T6D8] (describing the rise and trajectory of the 
#MeToo movement).  
 195. See I.R.C. § 62(a)(20) (2018).  
 196. See generally Leandra Lederman, IRS Reform: Politics as Usual?, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 36 
(2016) (describing historical and recent lack of support for the IRS and the negative 
consequences).  
 197. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 7 (quoting Treasury response to the Gold Star families mistake 
from the TCJA, which was, “[w]e are deeply grateful for the sacrifices made by our brave service 
members and their families and we are evaluating what can be done to solve this issue and provide 
relief to the families of our fallen heroes”).  
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likely to garner widespread outrage was likely too much for the IRS to bear. 
Moreover, as an individual income tax deduction affecting only sexual abuse 
victims who engaged in settlements subject to nondisclosure agreements, the 
sexual abuse legislative fix was actually a relatively low-cost fix. While the IRS 
clearly faced industry pressure to make the qualified improvement property 
fix as well, the IRS may have rightly judged that making the sexual abuse fix 
was even more important from a public-relations perspective, especially 
considering the relatively low cost of doing so, relative to the issue’s salience. 
Together, these sorts of practical considerations, which have no formal place 
in legal interpretation, nonetheless likely help motivate decisions about 
agency legislatives fixes.  
IV. EVALUATING AGENCY LEGISLATIVE FIXES 
Having identified the practice of agency legislative fixes, the next 
question is how to analyze them normatively. This Part explores how, even 
though agency legislative fixes may fill an important function for agencies and 
the public once Congress makes a legislative drafting mistake, they are still 
problematic from a normative perspective. Agency legislative fixes infringe on 
formal visions of legislative supremacy in a way that may not be remedied from 
a functional perspective. It is controversial to justify them as legitimate 
exercises of agency power. And even the practical case for them is somewhat 
ambiguous.  
A. LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY  
The first dimension for evaluating agency legislative fixes is how they 
impact legislative supremacy. From a formal perspective, agency legislative 
fixes are problematic. While there are some functional arguments in favor of 
agency legislative fixes, they are more contingent and contested.  
1. Formal Visions of Legislative Supremacy 
Formal visions of legislative supremacy look to whether or not Congress 
is the body stating what the law is, in accordance with the Constitution’s grant 
of legislative power to Congress.198 It is easy to dismiss agency legislative fixes 
as violating formal visions of legislative supremacy. The reason is both 
fundamental and straightforward: Fixing mistakes arguably enables branches 
of government other than Congress to make law. The Supreme Court 
underscored this concern in Lamie v. United States Trustee.199 In Lamie, a variety 
of clues in the statute’s text created the impression of an “apparent legislative 
drafting error.”200 Legislative history supported this conclusion (although 
 
 198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”). 
 199. Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004).  
 200. Id. at 530.  
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there were arguments to the contrary), and a leading treatise agreed.201 But 
the Court refused to deviate from a verbatim reading of the statute, explaining 
that, “[i]t results from ‘deference to the supremacy of the Legislature, as well 
as recognition that Congressmen typically vote on the language of a bill.’”202 
Indeed, this formal infringement on Congress’ lawmaking power may 
seem even more problematic when agencies carry it out. Executive agencies 
formally sit in the executive branch of government, and thus their exertion of 
power may seem to aggrandize the President’s power.203 Concerns about 
presidential aggrandizement have increased in recent years, with both 
political parties alleging that various presidential actions have weakened 
Congress and threatened to give the President a sort of imperial power.204 
Agency legislative fixes may exacerbate this tendency by allowing the 
President to direct agencies to say that the law is different than what Congress 
passed. In the extreme, agencies’ ability to make legislative fixes could render 
Congress powerless.  
2. Functional Visions of Legislative Supremacy 
But looking to Congress’ formal lawmaking role is not the only way to 
assess legislative supremacy. More functional visions of legislative supremacy 
ask how agency legislative fixes, or the lack thereof, affect Congress’ power 
relative to other institutional players.205 This analysis would consider real-
 
 201. Id. at 539–40.  
 202. Id. at 538 (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985)); see also King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2505 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the notion “that judges 
should endure whatever interpretive distortions it takes in order to correct a supposed flaw in the 
statutory machinery. . . . [I]gnores the American people’s decision to give Congress ‘[a]ll legislative 
Powers’ enumerated in the Constitution. They made Congress, not this Court, responsible for 
both making laws and mending them.” (citation omitted)).  
 203. See Daniel E. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative Law Against 
Political Control, 28 J.L. & POL. 129, 130 (2013) (explaining both how “many executive agencies 
are formally housed in the executive branch and are, at least in theory, subject to the control of 
political appointees (who are themselves directly accountable only to the executive branch and 
removable at will)” and how the reality may differ from this formal story of executive control over 
agency action (footnote omitted)).  
 204. See, e.g., Meagan Flynn, ‘Subvert the Constitution’: Trump’s 2014 Remarks on Obama’s 
Executive Actions Show ‘Hypocrisy,’ Critics Say, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2019, 5:59 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/02/15/subvert-constitution-trumps-remarks-
obamas-executive-actions-show-hypocrisy-critics-say/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.312a0d4f2999 
[https://perma.cc/UXX7-XCEP] (comparing Obama’s actions on immigration with Trump’s 
actions on the border wall); Kevin M. Kruse & Julian E. Zelizer, Have We Had Enough of the  
Imperial Presidency Yet?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/09/ 
opinion/president-trump-border-wall-weak.html [https://perma.cc/PD88-CNUJ] (arguing that 
Democratic and Republican presidents alike have overused executive power). See generally 
Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2016) (examining 
expansion of presidential control, in particular under the George W. Bush and Barack Obama 
presidencies).  
 205. See, e.g., Deacon, supra note 25, at 1564 (explaining that delegations of power to 
agencies are often examined based “in part on a set of functional considerations that depend on 
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world dynamics, including the multifaceted role of agencies in government.206 
From a functional perspective, there may be some arguments in favor of 
agency legislative fixes. In particular, the realities of how agencies operate and 
interact with Congress suggest that, in some ways, agency legislative fixes may 
promote Congress’ ability to legislate with specificity. To understand this 
point, it is essential to realize that when Congress passes legislation, it is not 
Congress members themselves, but rather an army of staffers, that is 
principally responsible for drafting the legislation.207 Recent research has 
revealed that Congress members pay little attention to the details of crafting 
legislation or the details of legislation itself, focusing instead on setting broad 
strokes of what the legislation will accomplish.208 They largely defer to staffers 
in turning these broad strokes into actual legislative language.209 Recent 
research has revealed that Congress members’ knowledge of what is actually 
in the text of enacted statutes typically comes from brief staffer-prepared 
summaries.210 
This army of legislative drafters matters because they commit the 
mistakes examined in this Article. Over and over, the types of errors that 
undermined congressional intent were erroneous cross-references (or 
erroneous failures to include cross-references) in the statute. This was true 
with the legislative drafting mistakes that occurred in the TCJA,211 the ACA,212 
and the Dodd–Frank Act.213 Prior research revealed professional drafters 
(principally Legislative Counsel), not Congress members themselves, make 
decisions about cross-references, including how new provisions relate to and 
 
a particular understanding of the roles played by Congress and agencies in the policymaking 
process” (footnote omitted)); Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of 
Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 423 (2012) (exploring the “functionalist 
considerations that make agencies well suited to receive and exercise delegations of policymaking 
power”); cf. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 616 (1984) (describing a functional approach to separation of 
powers as one that “assess[es] structural arrangements . . . in terms of their contribution to or 
detraction from the maintenance of tensions among the named branches”).  
 206. See Deacon, supra note 25, at 1564–65. 
 207. Christina L. Lyons, Congressional Staff, in 1 CQ PRESS, GUIDE TO CONGRESS, supra note 
31, at 698–700. See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34545, CONGRESSIONAL STAFF: DUTIES AND 
FUNCTIONS OF SELECTED POSITIONS (2012), available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/ 
pdf/RL/RL34545/7 [https://perma.cc/52NB-5VYN] (describing various staff positions).  
 208. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.  
 209. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.  
 210. Cross, supra note 16, at 85.  
 211. See supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text. 
 212. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 16, at 76–77 (explaining how the problematic four words 
central to the King litigation were erroneously taken from the Senate Finance Committee draft, 
thereby failing to make the necessary drafting changes to dovetail with the portion of the 
legislation that came from the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee).  
 213. See generally Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018) (finding that the 
definition of whistleblower was unambiguous). 
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should be cross-referenced relative to old ones.214 Thus, these drafters make 
decisions at the level that cause drafting mistakes. 
So, what is the impact of agency legislative fixes on such drafters’ choices? 
While it is of course difficult to say for sure, it is at least possible to consider 
the incentives such drafters face. Without such fixes, it may be riskier for 
legislative drafters to draft in detail. The more detailed the legislation, the 
higher the likelihood may be of making inadvertent mistakes.215 The lower 
the ability of agencies to easily correct such mistakes, the higher the cost of 
drafting detailed legislation. Conversely, if agency legislative fixes are more 
likely, more detailed legislation can be more easily corrected, lowering the 
risk of drafting in greater detail. Lowering the likelihood of agency legislative 
fixes thereby may encourage drafters to draft less detailed legislation, instead 
delegating more decisions to agencies.  
As scholars have recently argued, more congressional delegation to 
agencies may be problematic because it weakens Congress as a body.216 
Congress is supposed to make law through bicameralism and presentment.217 
When agencies have greater power to make legislative decisions, Congress 
members can avoid these onerous procedures and individually influence 
agencies through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms of control.218 
Congress’ complicity in greater delegation to agencies means Congress may 
no longer serve as a sufficient check on the executive. The evils that 
bicameralism and presentment are supposed to minimize, such as the power 
of factions to disproportionately control government, may instead be 
maximized.219 
 
 214. Oei & Osofsky, supra note 26, at 1324.  
 215. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 577 
(1992) (concluding that “[r]ules cost more to promulgate” than standards); David A. Weisbach, 
Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 871 (1999) (explaining that “as tax rules become 
complex, interaction costs increase rapidly and rules quickly become unmanageable”).  
 216. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive 
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2141 (2004) (raising democratic accountability concerns 
with Congress delegating decisions to agencies); Rao, supra note 123, at 1491–506 (positing that 
delegations to agencies fracture the collective Congress and yield various threats to separation of 
powers and related values); David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 744–45 (1999) (same). See generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN 
O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY 
MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999) (providing theory and literature review of 
congressional delegation). 
 217. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7; I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 949–59 (1983) (striking down 
assertion of unicameral veto power).  
 218. See supra notes 123–24 for discussion of formal and informal mechanisms of control. 
See generally Rao, supra note 123 (discussing these issues in the context of agency exercises of 
delegated power).  
 219. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (worrying over congressional aggrandizement 
of its powers); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 280–84 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) 
(discussing separation of powers); cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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Exacerbating the above incentives is the fact that legislative drafters may 
more acutely bear the error costs of detailed drafting, enhancing their 
incentives to delegate to a greater extent to agencies. Legislative drafters’ role, 
while crucial, is also typically largely invisible to the public. Drafters are 
supposed to carry out congressional will and, if all goes well, their role in the 
process will be relatively unseen. However, when legislative drafting errors 
occur, drafters’ roles become visible in the worst possible way. Indeed, a 
particularly notable example of this occurred in the context of the ACA and 
the legal challenge that threatened to imperil it. A New York Times article 
provided accounts of how the drafting error had come about, attributing it to 
a failure to add cross-references to the portion of the legislation providing tax 
subsidies.220 The article pointed out that “the [Senate] Finance Committee 
voted on a detailed conceptual description of the bill,” not on actual 
legislative language.221 The article focused on the role of staffers in drafting 
the actual legislative language, explaining that “[t]he words were written by 
professional drafters—skilled nonpartisan lawyers—from the office of the 
Senate legislative counsel,” even naming the individuals responsible for 
drafting the actual legislative language.222 While perhaps a particularly 
poignant example, all drafters would reasonably seek to avoid this type of 
attention for a critical drafting error. Indeed, in prior interview research of 
tax legislation drafters, one interviewee explained that staffers involved in 
drafting legislation are very concerned about their reputations among 
insiders who will evaluate the quality of the drafting.223 This is because staffers 
want to be able to gain employment later based on their reputations.224 This 
may create an agency cost problem in which legislating with greater specificity 
would be more desirable, but doing so increases the risk to legislative drafters 
in particular. These drafters thus may be inclined to legislate with less 
specificity to avoid such mistakes.  
A more lenient approach to legislative drafting mistakes may provide 
particular comfort to legislative drafters because they often have close 
 
533, 539 (1983) (“Under article I of the Constitution, not to mention the rules of the chambers 
of Congress, support is not enough for legislation.”).  
 220. Pear, supra note 9.  
 221. Id. 
 222. Id.  
 223. See Oei & Osofsky, supra note 26, at 1318. 
 224. See id. As anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon, there was a notable path from 
drafting the TCJA to private sector employment. See Cooper, supra note 29, at 1163 (pointing out 
that many of the chief staff architects of the TCJA had left for private industry); Asha Glover,  
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working relationships with their agency counterparts.225 A lenient approach 
would allow legislative drafters to draft with greater specificity, knowing they 
can work with their agency counterparts on the back-end to clean up any 
technical mistakes made in the legislative process. This could yield a legislative 
supremacy tradeoff, whereby agency legislative fixes might formally seem  
to infringe on Congress’ lawmaking supremacy, but functionally may 
encourage more specific decisions to be made by drafters under Congress’ 
auspices.  
But this possibility underscores a deeper question about what legislative 
supremacy means in a world in which Congress does not know the details of 
the legislation it is passing.226 From a functional perspective, does it really 
promote legislative supremacy to a greater extent for detailed decisions to be 
made at the congressional level if Congress will be unaware of those decisions? 
Some might say yes, pointing to the fact that congressional drafters at least 
work for Congress directly and are tasked with promoting Congress’ will.227 
But a functional approach must contend with what the difference really is in 
practice, especially to the extent that the alternative decisionmakers, agency 
staffers, are also career functionaries simply trying to make the legislation as 
technically workable as possible.228  
In other words, one might argue that agency legislative fixes promote a 
functional vision of legislative supremacy, for instance as a result of various 
drafting incentives. But arguments along these lines are more contingent on 
how the legislative process actually plays out in reality. More deeply, the 
functional argument runs into the problem of articulating what legislative 
supremacy really means in the realities of the legislative process. Thus, while 
arguments can certainly be made that agency legislative fixes promote some 
functional visions of legislative supremacy, the case does not clearly overcome 
more formalist objections.  
 
 225. See, e.g., Jarrod Shobe, Agency Legislative History, 68 EMORY L.J. 283, 285–86, 291 (2018) 
(exploring generally how there is a “blurred line” between the legislative and regulatory 
processes, as agency officials are “intimately involved in drafting, revising, and negotiating 
legislation”); Walker, supra note 26, at 1388–89 (describing working relationships between 
congressional staffers and agency officials). 
 226. Oei & Osofsky, supra note 26, at 1353–55 (questioning how to legitimate staffers’ 
extensive role in the legislative drafting process).  
 227. See, e.g., Shobe, supra note 26, at 829 (noting how Legislative Counsel is careful to note 
that its job is to implement Congress’ policy decisions).  
 228. See, e.g., Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies in the 
Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 499 (2017) (pointing out that “the vast majority of 
agency staffers are career employees who spend the bulk of their career working for one agency,” 
and that such agency staffers often have even greater knowledge about their governing legislation 
than Congress does). 
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B. LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF AGENCY AUTHORITY? 
It is also difficult to justify agency legislative fixes as exercises of legitimate 
agency power. This related lens focuses on the power agencies are exercising, 
instead of the power Congress is losing. This lens asks: When agencies issue 
legislative fixes, may these fixes be a legitimate exercise of agency authority? 
Here, too, the answer is problematic. This is in part due to deeply contested 
views about agency legitimacy, layered onto the complicated, multifaceted 
nature of agency legislative fixes. 
As an initial matter, the justifications for agencies creating public rights 
and responsibilities are deeply contested.229 The Constitution does not 
mention agencies, and agency officials are not elected.230 Over time, scholars 
have developed a variety of theories to justify agencies’ exercises of power.231 
In some ways, one model in particular, the expertise model of the 
administrative state, seems to implicate and potentially legitimate agency 
legislative fixes. Under this model, agency officials are “not political, but 
professional,” providing “an objective basis” that is achieved through exercise 
of agencies’ “specialized experience.”232 In essence, the expertise model 
suggests that agency discretion can be justified because the agency decisions 
are actually not discretionary. Rather, expert analysis compels agency 
decisions.233 
The technical and somewhat limited nature of many agency legislative 
fixes in some ways seems to map onto this expertise model. While Congress 
and courts face substantial, sometimes self-imposed, barriers in correcting 
legislative drafting mistakes in a timely fashion, it is still the case that they will 
correct some.234 As an example, even if the Supreme Court did not say so, it 
was willing to correct a legislative drafting mistake when the viability of the 
signature legislative achievement of the Obama administration turned on 
it.235 And, while Congress may face significant difficulty in correcting its 
legislative drafting mistakes in the legislation’s aftermath, it too may muster 
the political will to do so when both the political consequences of failing to 
do so are extreme enough and enough other pieces of the legislative puzzle 
 
 229. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
117, 123 (2006) (describing agency legitimacy as “a contested concept resting on other contested 
concepts”). 
 230. Mendelson, supra note 128, at 417. 
 231. For further discussion of these and other models and the evolution of views regarding 
agency legitimacy over time, see, for example, Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: 
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 469–91 (2003). 
 232. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1678 (1975) (describing the expertise model).  
 233. See, e.g., id. (describing that, under the expertise model, “the discretion that the 
administrator enjoys is more apparent than real”).  
 234. In the case of Congress, they may correct many in the long-run, as political winds 
eventually allow opportunities to do so. 
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 100–08.  
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fall in place.236 This means the types of mistakes left to agencies alone will 
tend to be less politically sensitive. In such cases, agencies may be well-
positioned, with their knowledge of the statute’s intricacies, to identify 
mistakes and make the fixes. If this narrative holds, then agency legislative 
fixes may be a legitimate exercise of agency expertise. 
But the expertise model generally suffers from some weaknesses, which 
are certainly applicable in the case of agency legislative fixes. Namely, agency 
decisions are often value-laden policy choices rather than pure exercises of 
expertise.237 As applied to agency legislative fixes, the concern would be that 
many fixes are not necessarily obvious applications of expert analysis, but 
rather reflect agency officials exercising politically motivated policy judgment. 
The sexual abuse attorney fees fix illustrates this phenomenon well. On  
the one hand, the sexual abuse mistake seems like a mere technical  
drafting mistake—the drafters inserted a too-broad cross-reference to “this 
chapter”238—a mistake that the agency, through the use of its expertise, could 
correct. On the other hand, the insertion of the too-broad cross-reference to 
“this chapter” may reflect a deeper failure to think through how the new 
deduction disallowance would have ramifications throughout the code and 
disadvantage politically sensitive constituencies. One could just as easily 
characterize this as a policy, or even political, error. If this were the case, the 
fix would no longer be an inevitable or objective exercise of agency expertise.  
If expertise alone may not justify the universe of agency legislative fixes, 
there are other options. One possibility is that agency legislative fixes may be 
characterized as part of an agency’s authority to fill in legislative ambiguity. 
Scholars have often defended the highly contested Chevron doctrine on the 
ground that agencies should have the authority to fill in ambiguities in  
statutes because agencies answer to the politically accountable executive 
department.239 If this justification holds for ambiguity generally, perhaps 
legislative drafting mistakes should be seen as creating statutory ambiguity, 
which agencies thus have the power to resolve.  
 
 236. See infra text accompanying notes 251–58. 
 237. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 232, at 1683 (“Today, the exercise of agency discretion is 
inevitably seen as the essentially legislative process of adjusting the competing claims of various 
private interests affected by agency policy.” (footnote omitted)).  
 238. See sources cited supra note 139.  
 239. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is 
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices  
. . . .”); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 
1202 (2007) (“As emphasized in Chevron, the executive, unlike the judiciary, is politically 
accountable as well as uniquely knowledgeable, and its accountability argues for deference to its 
judgments about how to assess the competing facts and values.” (footnote omitted)).  
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There are multiple difficulties with this approach. First, as alluded to 
above, the Chevron doctrine itself is under sustained attack.240 Moreover, even 
if one subscribes to Chevron’s allocation of power to agencies in cases of 
statutory ambiguity, it is not clear whether legislative drafting mistakes 
constitute ambiguity. In a close analogue to the question, there is 
disagreement among judges about whether problems in statutory regimes 
create ambiguity that merits Chevron deference.241 One’s approach to this 
question may well turn on not only one’s view regarding whether agency 
power should be seen as legitimate only when Congress clearly intended to 
delegate to the agency, but also on the equally weighty question of what is the 
best mode of statutory interpretation. While a textualist may be less inclined 
to find any ambiguity when the statute seems clear, more purposivist 
approaches may find that suggestions of congressional intent in conflict with 
the statutory text may create ambiguity about the text, which then may supply 
an agency the power to identify a legislative drafting mistake and fix it.242  
Clearly, questions about which mode of statutory interpretation is better, 
along with questions about what justifies agency power, are massive. Extensive 
amounts have been written about each of these subjects.243 The depth of these 
issues means that whether agencies can legitimately fix legislative drafting 
mistakes depends on inherently contested, rather than consensus, visions of 
agency power and methods of interpretation. 
 
 240. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. 937, 946–55 (2018) (cataloguing the growing chorus of attacks on Chevron from members 
of the judiciary, Congress, and academia).  
 241. Compare, e.g., Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 75 (2014) (plurality opinion) 
(concluding that Chevron deference is meant precisely to ensure that courts defer to agencies’ 
reasonable constructions of self-contradictory provisions in a complex statutory scheme), with id. 
at 76 (Roberts, J., concurring) (“Direct conflict is not ambiguity, and the resolution of such a 
conflict is not statutory construction but legislative choice. Chevron is not a license for an agency 
to repair a statute that does not make sense.” (footnote omitted)). 
 242. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Tatel, J., 
dissenting in part) (arguing that “[b]ecause the court’s reading of a portion of the statute 
establishes a bizarre and unprecedented regulatory regime that conflicts with other provisions of 
the text, undermines the statute’s purpose and structure, finds no support in the legislative 
history, and produces a result that serves no apparent legislative purpose, and because a perfectly 
plausible alternative explanation exists,” the court should have found enough ambiguity to 
trigger deference to the agency’s logical and simple alternative). 
 243. See, e.g., Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Order in Multiplicity: Aristotle on Text, Context, and the Rule 
of Law, 79 N.C. L. REV. 577, 585 n.25 (2001) (“The literature attempting to explicate theories of 
statutory interpretation is, however, voluminous.”); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing 
—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (2012) 
(“Administrative law scholars have leveled a forest of trees exploring the mysteries of the Chevron 
approach contemporary judges take to reviewing law-related aspects of administrative action.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
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C. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Finally, turning away from grand constitutional and democratic theory, 
agency legislative fixes also have practical impacts. Practical considerations 
present the strongest case for agency legislative fixes because such fixes may 
play an important role in protecting relationships between agencies and the 
public. However, even along this practical dimension, there is ambiguity 
about whether agency legislative fixes have a positive or negative effect overall. 
And it is unclear whether any practical benefits could overcome more 
foundational problems.  
1. Benefits of Fixing the Law 
From an agency perspective, once a mistake in legislation has been made, 
agency legislative fixes serve an important role. Failing to fix a legislative 
drafting mistake through guidance is costly, both financially and 
reputationally, to the agency. Not fixing the mistake means the agency may 
be expending resources to enforce the law in a manner Congress did not 
intend, sometimes in a fashion that runs strongly counter to public opinion. 
The sexual abuse attorney fee mistake is a prime example of this dilemma. As 
discussed previously, the lack of an agency legislative fix would have required 
the IRS to very publicly and likely painfully fall on its sword in defense of an 
outcome no one actually wanted.244 
Absent an agency legislative fix, an agency could avoid the consequences 
of a legislative drafting mistake simply by not enforcing it. Indeed, the Senate 
Republicans who wrote to Treasury in the wake of the TCJA suggested that 
the IRS should rely on selective enforcement to carry out Congress’ intent.245 
Various practitioners seconded that this outcome may be better than Treasury 
using its resources to enforce the law in a way that Congress did not intend.246  
However, nonenforcement is problematic as well. It forces regulated 
parties to assume the regulating agency will ignore the law. It also has the 
potential, problematic effect of inadvertently encouraging regulated parties 
to engage in self-help more broadly when they believe that there is a problem 
with the law. Nonenforcement also places an arbitrarily higher burden  
on regulated parties who comply with the law as written, either because,  
by disposition, they are incapable of doing otherwise, or, even more 
problematically, because they do not have access to the informal sources of 
information that suggest they should do otherwise. 
More generally, addressing legislative drafting mistakes through a policy 
of nonenforcement pushes the subordination of the text of the law deeper 
 
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 194–97. 
 245. See Finance Committee Republicans, supra note 160.  
 246. See, e.g., Richman, Practitioners, supra note 187, at 1618–20 (cataloguing various 
practitioners’ suggestions, including having central IRS agents tell the IRS examiners not to raise 
the issues on exam).  
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inside the agency, making the infringement on legislative text less transparent 
to the public. While some well-connected parties are likely to know of the 
nonenforcement policy, others are not, yielding inequities in access to the law 
as applied. Worst of all, if the agency relies on de facto nonenforcement, rather 
than an official, public policy against enforcement, the agency leaves 
individual agents leeway to deviate from the nonenforcement, setting the 
stage for inequitable treatment under the law.247  
2. Negative Impacts on Agency Guidance Practices 
While agency legislative fixes provide some clear practical benefits, there 
are also some likely practical costs. As fleshed out previously, agencies are 
likely to be more willing to issue legislative fixes when they can do so without 
being challenged.248 This means agencies are systematically more likely to 
issue legislative fixes through informal guidance, and in a way that favors 
regulated parties.  
Agencies’ use of informal guidance may undermine important values. 
The elaborate notice-and-comment procedures that accompany agency 
promulgation of regulations are designed to promote participation and 
accountability in the regulatory process.249 These values are thought to infuse 
agency decision-making with legitimacy that is lost when Congress delegates 
governance decisions to unelected agency officials.250 When an agency instead 
uses less formal means of making administrative decisions, these procedures, 
and the values they are supposed to promote, are lost, undermining 
legitimacy of agency decisions.251  
 
 247. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1691 (2004) (discussing problems with informal or internal agency 
policies of nonenforcement); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 
1836, 1919–20 (2015) (same); Osofsky, supra note 127, at 102–03 (same); Peter L. Strauss, 
Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 
ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 808 (2001) (same).  
 248. See supra text accompanying notes 126–30. 
 249. See, e.g., TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 26 (1947), available at https://www.regulationwriters.com/ 
downloads/AttorneyGeneralsManual.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6PP-JC5C] (explaining that the 
purpose of the rulemaking procedures “is to guarantee to the public an opportunity to 
participate”); 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.8 (4th ed. 2002) 
(describing the benefits of administrative rulemaking including, among others, political 
accountability).  
 250. See, e.g., Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing the 
need for rulemaking procedures to legitimize agency legislative decisions). 
 251. Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like 
—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1317–18 (1992) 
(discussing the values lost when an agency uses informal guidance to actually or practically bind 
the public). But see, e.g., Metzger, supra note 247, at 1919–20 (explaining that informal “guidance 
is a crucial part of agency efforts to fulfill their internal oversight responsibilities and curtail lower-
level discretion” (footnote omitted)).  
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Moreover, the fact that agencies are likely to feel freer in issuing 
legislative fixes that benefit, rather than hurt, regulated parties, is likely to 
skew the direction of legislation. All other things being equal, Congress is 
likely to pass laws with legislative drafting mistakes that both benefit and harm 
regulated parties. This means that, while particular legislative drafting 
mistakes may have particularized costs, legislative drafting mistakes in general 
should not be expected to advantage or disadvantage either regulated parties 
or the general public, relative to each other. But, if agency legislative fixes 
systematically occur in a pro-regulated party direction, they are likely to bias 
the law in a way that diverges from the law as passed by Congress.  
The fact that even the practical case for agency legislative fixes is 
ambiguous is telling. There are certainly reasons why agencies would offer 
legislative fixes. They can save the agency and the public from having to take 
positions contrary to what Congress actually wanted. But this benefit comes at 
a significant cost in terms of other negative practical consequences, as well as 
deeper potential threats to legislative supremacy and agency legitimacy. In a 
world in which Congress is finding it easier to make mistakes but harder to 
correct them, agency legislative fixes fill an important, but problematic, role.  
V. POTENTIAL PATHS FORWARD 
The widespread nature of agency legislative fixes, combined with the 
normative problems with such fixes, begs the question: Are there any better 
paths forward? This Part suggests there are no easy, magic wand solutions. 
However, there are some discrete changes that may help both Congress and 
agencies address the legislative drafting mistakes that are inevitable in today’s 
legislative process.  
A. STICK CONGRESS WITH ITS MISTAKES 
One possibility is for agencies to simply stop issuing agency legislative 
fixes. In other words, just stick Congress with its own mistakes. As outlined in 
Part II, there are often high costs in Congress correcting its own mistakes.252 
In some cases, these high costs essentially mean there is no foreseeable path 
for Congress to fix its mistakes.253 However, as suggested in Section IV.B, 
sometimes the costs may not be insurmountable, especially in the long-term 
as political conditions continue to shift.254 Congress is more likely to be able 
 
 252. See supra Part II. 
 253. This was true of the critical drafting mistake that threatened to imperil the ACA. By the 
time members of the public had identified the mistake, the new Republican control of the House 
of Representatives seemingly foreclosed any paths to fixing the mistake. See infra text 
accompanying note 286. 
 254. See supra Section IV.B; cf. Hershey Jr., supra note 50 (pointing out that, after the passage 
of the last major tax reform, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there was also a significant delay in 
passing many of the needed technical corrections because of concerns that attempting to pass 
them would re-enmesh Congress in substantive tax policy debates).  
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to correct its mistakes when the pressure is high to make a fix and other 
legislative conditions smooth the way, such as the availability of another must-
pass piece of bipartisan legislation on which the corrections can ride.255 To 
increase the likelihood of a fix, the party that wants the fix may be able to get 
it by giving the other party large concessions. Exemplifying this last possibility, 
Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown explained in the wake of the TCJA, 
“[w]e’re not going to say to Republicans, ‘Oh tell us what you want to do,’ 
. . . . We want to make the bill better, not just correct whatever technical fix is 
needed.”256  
One particular fix from the TCJA exemplifies these dynamics well. The 
only legislative drafting mistake Congress was able to fix in relatively short 
order after the passage of the TCJA was the so-called “grain glitch.” The grain 
glitch was a drafting mistake made in a new provision for pass-through 
businesses, which created significant, unintended disadvantages for certain 
agricultural businesses as well as a loophole for aggressive tax planning.257 
Congress passed a fix in March 2018, approximately three months after 
passage of the TCJA, by attaching it to a must-pass appropriations act.258 
Democrats agreed to the addition of the grain glitch fix in exchange for an 
expansion of the low-income housing tax credit.259 
To some, the notion that some price could be paid to make some number 
of fixes at the congressional level may be enough to reject agency legislative 
fixes entirely. The legislative enterprise is fundamentally one of concession 
and compromise.260 The fact that legislative fixes may be quite difficult for 
Congress to make perhaps should not excuse Congress from making them. 
Alleviating Congress of this obligation may be an abrogation of Congress’ 
burden to find compromises precisely when it is hard to do so.  
 
 255. See, e.g., Asha Glover, Senate, House Agree on Need for Technical Corrections, 163 TAX NOTES 
1580, 1580 (2019) (describing this dynamic in the post-TCJA context). Indeed, the much-
delayed passage of a qualified improvement property fix as part of the emergency CARES Act 
legislation illustrates this dynamic particularly well. See supra note 172 for a discussion of the 
CARES Act.  
 256. Faler, supra note 8.  
 257. See, e.g., Bob Bryan, Republicans Made a Huge Mistake in Their Tax Bill—And They’re 
Scrambling to Fix It, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 21, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ 
grain-glitch-tax-bill-mistake-omnibus-bill-fix-2018-3 [https://perma.cc/V4DD-VDKC] (explaining 
the problem).  
 258. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 101, 132 Stat. 348; see 
SATURNO, HENIFF JR. & LYNCH, supra note 71 (describing the appropriations process generally); 
Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note 44, at 1832 (discussing how Congress sometimes adds 
substantive legislation as riders on must-pass appropriations bills, to make it harder to defeat the 
riders).  
 259. Andrew Khouri, Boost to Affordable Housing is Part of New $1.3-Trillion Federal Budget, L.A. 
TIMES, https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-affordable-housing-tax-20180323-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/VPB8-BHXY] (last updated Mar. 23, 2018, 2:30 PM).  
 260. See, e.g., Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. 523, 534 (2018) 
(exploring the well-known proposition that legislation depends on compromise).  
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But taking this perspective to the extreme shows there has to be some 
stopping point at which simply sticking Congress with mistakes becomes 
untenable. A legislative problem cannot be justified by the fact that some 
price, no matter how extreme, could theoretically be paid to fix it. The 
question is whether the cost is too high to fix the problem legislatively relative 
to other options. This Article has illustrated how the lack of agency legislative 
fixes creates real costs to the agency and the public in the many cases in which 
Congress simply cannot or will not alleviate them in a timely fashion. With the 
sexual abuse attorney fee mistake, for instance, it would not just be Congress, 
but also the IRS, and sexual abuse victims, who would bear the price for 
Congress not acting in time. Likewise, in the case of qualified improvement 
property, affected taxpayers complained bitterly about the lack of a timely 
qualified improvement property fix. The Retail Leaders Industry Association 
lamented that the failure to fix the mistake had “stifled growth and innovation 
across the industry,” and the National Retail Federation argued that the error 
affected “jobs in retail, restaurants and construction in every community in 
the country.”261 Moreover, others complained that the failure to get any sort 
of fix prior to the first tax return filing season impacted by the TCJA created 
“substantial uncertainty” for taxpayers about what they should do in filing 
their tax returns.262 The cost of such delay of course only compounds as time 
continues to pass without any resolution of the issue. The question, then, is 
not whether Congress can enact fixes at any cost, but rather what the best 
option is given all of the various costs of the differing, potential solutions.  
Moreover, even to the extent that the right weighing of benefits and costs 
argues in favor of sticking Congress with its mistakes, it is not clear that this is 
the path agencies will actually take. Sticking Congress with its own mistakes 
may vindicate long-term constitutional and democratic values, but it is likely 
to do so by imposing significant costs on agencies and their relationships with 
the public, as in the case of the sexual abuse attorney fee mistake. As the 
decisionmaker, the agency is likely to focus on its own benefits from agency 
legislative fixes to a greater extent than is optimal. As a result, even in 
situations in which sticking Congress with its own mistakes is preferable, 
agency legislative fixes are likely to continue to some extent.  
B. FIRST-BEST SOLUTION: MAJOR CHANGES TO LEGISLATION 
If sticking Congress with its own mistakes is an imperfect solution, then 
what are other options? The first-best solution would be for Congress to 
change its legislative drafting practices to make fewer mistakes. For instance, 
if part of the reason why Congress is making so many mistakes is that the 
legislative process is rushed, overly chaotic, or lacks a final point at which all 
 
 261. Jad Chamseddine, Bill to Fix Retail Glitch in TCJA Gets House Companion, 163 TAX NOTES 
147, 147 (2019).  
 262. Richman, GOP Taxwriters, supra note 187, at 1161. 
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of the different inputs are checked, Congress could add a mandatory 
deliberation period to the process or a time-period in which the legislation 
must be checked before Congress can vote. Congress could also make 
particular members, or a committee, responsible for overseeing this final 
deliberation period, to try to ensure that at least some Congress members 
have a vested stake in avoiding errors across legislation. Alternatively, 
Congress could implement an even broader review process, akin to the notice-
and-comment procedures that apply in the administrative rulemaking 
context.263 Like with administrative rulemaking, providing draft legislation to 
the public may allow expert commentators to catch legislative drafting 
mistakes prior to their passage.264 Indeed, the Administrative Conference of 
the United States is currently engaged in a pilot program that attempts to 
improve legislative drafting.265 
However, these and other first-best suggestions to change congressional 
procedures face a fundamental barrier: Congress itself. The reason why 
legislation looks the way it does today is because Congress has found its 
legislative practices advantageous to passing legislation. For instance, drafters 
have indicated that keeping legislation secret as long as possible can often be 
critical to keeping lobbyists at bay who would otherwise pounce and begin to 
unravel the legislation’s chance at passage.266 When Congress pushes 
legislation through at lightning speed, it is often because members used speed 
as a tactic to pass legislation.267 Thus, when mistakes happen it is often the 
case that more careful deliberation did not occur because drafters did not 
have time to slow down or the liberty to circulate the legislation in a way that 
would invite error correction. As for designated individuals or committees 
tasked with making sure all the legislation fits together in the right way, there 
are already numerous processes in place within Congress to ensure that 
 
 263. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 264. See, e.g., Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369, 373–74 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting 
instrumental function of notice-and-comment procedures in the rulemaking context).  
 265. Gavin Young, Statutory Review Program, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., https://www.acus.gov/ 
research-projects/statutory-review-program [https://perma.cc/4T2P-GLW5].  
 266. Fleischer, supra note 47, at 20 (articulating the playbook of keeping partisan legislation 
secret as long as possible and then passing it as quickly as possible to beat out the opposition); 
Oei & Osofsky, supra note 26, at 1326 (discussing the need to keep bills secret from lobbyists to 
ensure passage); see also, e.g., SCHICK, supra note 39, at 165–66 (describing the House Ways and 
Means Committee’s practice of striking legislative deals in private prior to publicly convening to 
approve them to stave off lobbyist interference).  
 267. For one assertion that this was the case with the TCJA, see Catherine Rampell, Why Are 
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drafting decisions are checked and cross-checked.268 But, Congress and its 
staffers are unable to catch all mistakes when they are operating under a crush 
of time pressure and other chaotic conditions. Adding additional committees 
or designated individuals will not change the basic dynamics that are currently 
producing drafting mistakes.  
To generalize the problem, suggesting wholesale changes to legislative 
practices to prevent legislative drafting mistakes is an example of the  
inside/out fallacy. This fallacy involves diagnosing a problem by appreciating 
the real-world constraints an institution faces, and then proposing solutions 
that appear to magically solve the problem by ignoring all those constraints.269 
This Article has sought to carefully explain the real-world dynamics that lead 
to legislative drafting mistakes and the accompanying agency legislative fixes. 
Having done so, it is untenable to then assume away these very realities to 
suggest ways to eliminate the causes of such mistakes. 
C. SECOND-BEST SOLUTIONS 
If first-best wholesale changes to legislative drafting practices are not 
plausible enough to eliminate the need for agency legislative fixes, what about 
second-best solutions? As a general matter, second-best solutions present well-
known problems. According to the theory of the second best, if optimal 
solutions cannot be reached, it is unclear whether second-best solutions will 
move towards or away from the ideal.270 Moreover, second-best solutions 
arguably also can present inside/out fallacies. While being mindful of these 
limitations, the discussion below analyzes the extent to which several potential 
second-best solutions are actually plausible and identifies the values each of 
the possibilities vindicate and undermine.   
1. Backend Legislative Fixes 
While wholesale front-end legislative changes may not be realistic, 
perhaps Congress could plausibly make it easier to make backend legislative 
fixes. As explored previously, the current reconciliation rules stymie 
Congress’ ability to fix its own mistakes.271 The current practice is to treat 
mistakes as having no effect on outlays or revenues, because they do not affect 
the legislation as scored on original legislative passage.272 This means 
 
 268. See, e.g., Shobe, supra note 26, at 840 (describing the careful back and forth between 
legislative counsel and American Law Division attorneys to ensure that provisions are drafted 
correctly).   
 269. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 
1745 (2013). 
 270. See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, The Case for “Business as Usual” in Law-and-Economics Land: 
A Critical Comment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 387, 387 (1993) (providing an alternative explanation of the 
theory of the second best).  
 271. See supra Part II. 
 272. See supra notes 75–76, 81–83 and accompanying text.  
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Congress is subject to a higher vote count in passing legislative fixes than it 
was subject to in passing the original legislation.273 The result is that it is 
extremely hard for Congress to fix mistakes in legislation it has passed.  
Understanding this dynamic lends itself to a potential improvement: 
Congress could change its practices to allow Congress to fix legislative drafting 
mistakes through reconciliation. This would allow Congress to correct 
mistakes via the same vote count as the original legislation. This should 
improve Congress’ ability to correct its own drafting mistakes.  
As a practical matter, this suggested change is more easily achievable than 
wholesale, front-end legislative reform. Budgeting rules in general are 
endogenous to Congress and have changed over time as Congress has seen fit 
to change them.274 The whole question of what should be used as the baseline 
for determining whether legislation would affect revenue (thereby making it 
eligible for reconciliation) is poorly understood.275 As suggested previously, 
budget estimators are not bound by formalized rules in making such 
determinations.276 Rather, estimators rely on informal practices, which the 
Senate Parliamentarian applies under a fair amount of opacity and 
subjectivity.277 As a result, if Congress wants to allow legislative drafting 
mistakes to be corrected in reconciliation, it could do so by changing the 
baseline for reconciliation eligibility from the existing approach of law as 
erroneously scored to an approach of law as enacted. This would mean that 
fixing legislative drafting mistakes would affect revenue, making the fixes 
eligible for reconciliation and the lower vote count it requires. The Senate 
Parliamentarian could make this change in consultation with members of 
Congress or the relevant advisory bodies such as CBO and JCT.278  
This suggestion may seem audacious to some. Many believe Congress has 
already expanded reconciliation well beyond its original intention, to bad 
 
 273. See supra Section II.C. 
 274. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, US Experience with Federal Budget Rules, 7 CESIFO DICE REP.: J. 
FOR INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS 41, 42–43 (2009) (describing briefly the federal budget rules 
over time and how and why they have shifted); Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1007, 1023–24 (2011) (describing generally the endogeneity of legislative rules).  
 275. See, e.g., DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, TAXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S MARCH 
TOWARD BANKRUPTCY 159 (2007) (“The choice of a baseline is inevitably arbitrary, or at least 
subject to differing interpretations.”). 
 276. See supra Section II.C. 
 277. Aprill & Hemel, supra note 1, at 104–08, 122–25, 131–32, 133–35 (discussing opacity 
and subjectivity of the application of the Byrd rule); David Kamin & Rebecca Kysar, Temporary Tax 
Laws and the Budget Baseline, 157 TAX NOTES 125, 126 (2017); Yin, supra note 65, at 221.  
 278. For scoring purposes, Congress looks to CBO estimates, which rely on the data prepared 
by the JCT. SCHICK, supra note 39, at 170. Although it would seem that the Senate 
Parliamentarian would have to be the one to make the change, Congress has shown itself capable 
of getting what it wants when its view conflicts with the Senate Parliamentarian’s. See id. at 148 
–49 (describing firing of Senate Parliamentarian as a result of dispute over reconciliation 
procedures); Newton-Small, supra note 62 (detailing back and forth between different 
parliamentarians to allow Congress to get what it wanted). 
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effect,279 and thus suggestions to increase eligibility for reconciliation may 
seem ill-advised.280 Some might think relying on the subjectivity and opacity 
of the budget rules to suggest Congress could easily make a change without 
requiring any formal process is a bad precedent to set.281 Some may worry that 
allowing the original legislation to pass based on a scoring assumption that 
the legislation is doing one thing, and then passing corrective legislation 
based on the fact that it really did another thing, may allow Congress to use 
shifting baselines in a way that games the legislative process. Scholars have 
forcefully raised the shifting baselines concern with respect to temporary 
legislation.282  
However, this legitimate concern about shifting baselines does not apply 
well in the context of legislative drafting mistakes. Using the enacted 
legislation as the baseline, even when it was erroneously scored, holds 
Congress to an objective, fixed baseline—the law as actually enacted. As a 
result, the proposed baseline should provide Congress members little leeway 
to game the system. If Congress had intended to make the law x and scorers 
accordingly assumed it was x when it was enacted, but it really says y, and 
Congress wants to return it to the intended x, then x presumably was eligible 
 
 279. See, e.g., Jeff Davis, The Rule that Broke the Senate, POLITICO MAG. (Oct. 15, 2017), https:// 
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/10/15/how-budget-reconciliation-broke-congress-215706 
[https://perma.cc/9KZM-AN64] (forcefully making this argument). However, as a contrary 
point of view, some have argued that the limitations on the ability to use reconciliation are 
arbitrary and can have deleterious effects on legislation. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. 19325 (Remarks 
of Rep. Rostenkowski) (“As a result of [the Byrd Rule], policies that would have significantly 
improved the Medicare Program could not even be considered. . . . Even more absurd is the fact 
that most of the items stripped were minor and technical provisions that received bipartisan 
support when they passed both the House and the Senate last year.”).  
 280. See, e.g., David Kamin, Basing Budget Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 153–60 
(2015) (summarizing the history of budgeting baselines and concluding that “[i]t is a history not 
just of widespread use but also of confusion and abuse”); cf. Aprill & Hemel, supra note 1, at 102 
(arguing that “the Byrd rule preserves a role for the minority party in the Senate, potentially 
promoting a more consensus-oriented approach to lawmaking”).   
 281. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 65, at 225–26 (lamenting lack of transparency into Byrd rule 
determinations). But see, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the U.S. Budget 
Process, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 75–80 
(Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy & Howell E. Jackson eds., 2008) (positing that opacity 
can have some benefits such as stymieing interest group influence).  
 282. Most notably, some scholars have argued that shifting baselines allow Congress to pass 
permanent tax cuts without ever fully taking into account the cost of such cuts. Kamin & Kysar, 
supra note 277, at 130–32; Kysar, supra note 274, at 1028–33. Congress does so by first passing 
temporary tax cuts, which expire at the end of the budget window. By making the tax cuts 
temporary, Congress is able to argue initially that the tax cuts will not have a revenue cost outside 
of the budget window. Then, when the tax cuts are about to expire, proponents of the tax cuts 
argue that, since the tax cuts have been in effect for quite some time, the scoring baseline should 
assume that the tax cuts are permanent. The effect is that shifting baselines allows Congress to 
pass tax cuts it never would have been able to in the first instance, had it been forced to fully take 
into account the cost of such cuts. Kamin & Kysar, supra note 277, at 130–32; Kysar, supra note 
274, at 1028–33. 
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for reconciliation in the first instance. So, using a baseline of the law as 
actually enacted, even when it was erroneously scored, should not improperly 
enable Congress to pass legislation that is only possible through shifting 
baselines.283 
Moreover, the change being proposed in the context of legislative 
drafting mistakes is simply the right policy. While the budget rules are no 
model of consistency, they do generally look to current law as a baseline for 
budget analysis.284 This suggests that the practice of using the existing law, as 
previously scored, is actually a deviation from typical baseline budget policies 
rather than a necessary manifestation of them. Applying a baseline of the 
existing law, as actually enacted, is not only consistent with general baseline 
practices, but is also the only reasonable option when the actual law is 
different than what the scorers thought that it was. The alternative 
unreasonably holds, in an almost Kafkaesque fashion, that, as a matter of law, 
the law is the law as enacted, while, as a matter of budgeting, the law is the law 
as previously scored.  
So, if the approach being offered is arguably plausible and would be a 
real improvement, what, if anything, might be the problems with it? First, 
while it might benefit the political party in power to change the baseline 
practices in order to fix their legislative drafting mistakes through 
reconciliation, doing so may also enable the other political party to then 
correct their mistakes more easily in the future. This concern about changing 
the rules in a way that benefits one’s own political party in the short term but 
may ultimately benefit the other political party in the long term arguably 
explains the filibuster’s durability.285 Whether this dynamic would serve as a 
significant enough obstacle to changing the baseline practices with respect to 
legislative drafting mistakes is not clear. One reason to be optimistic about 
the possibility of changing the baseline practices is that both parties may see 
 
 283. To be sure, Congress is likely to find some unanticipated ways to abuse any budgeting 
rule. However, the mere possibility of abuse should not prevent us from moving toward the most 
sensible rule in a given context.  
 284. The Budget Enforcement Act, which controls at least some aspects of budgeting 
procedures, states that the baseline shall be calculated under the assumption that “[l]aws 
providing or creating direct spending and receipts are assumed to operate in the manner specified 
in those laws for each such year.” Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.  
101-508, § 257, 104 Stat. 1388–591 (emphasis added). This baseline assumption would seem to 
call for applying the law as enacted, not the law as (incorrectly) scored. See Kamin, supra note 
280, at 188–91 (explaining how the assumptions underlying the Budget Enforcement Act control 
in certain circumstances, but how CBO and OMB have also deviated from them in various ways); 
see also, e.g., SCHICK, supra note 39, at 61 (explaining how, generally, the baseline is “the amount 
that would be spent if current law continues in effect without change.”); Yin, supra note 65, at 
185–87 (discussing the current law baseline).  
 285. Cf. Samarth Desai, The Senator’s Dilemma: Game Theory, Gorsuch, and the Nuclear Option, 
HARV. POL. REV. (Apr. 8, 2017), http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/senators-dilemma-
game-theory-gorsuch-nuclear-option [https://perma.cc/873D-RCKP] (explaining future cost to 
Republicans of having eliminated the filibuster for Supreme Court confirmations).  
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this change as often advantageous to them whether the other party passed the 
legislation or not. This is because, once the original legislation is passed, both 
parties often would prefer to have the fixes made so that the legislation is at 
least as functional as possible, but may be hampered in their ability to actually 
vote for changes to legislation that they opposed. Making it easier for the party 
in power to make the changes through reconciliation may yield a win-win of 
allowing the opposing party to fix the legislation through reconciliation, 
without actually having to vote for it.286  
However, even to the extent Congress changes the baseline practices for 
reconciliation eligibility, Congress may face political obstacles in making use 
of the change. An election on the heels of the passage of the original 
legislation may mean the majority party that passed the original legislation 
can no longer garner even the lower number of votes required to pass the 
original legislation. For example, in the case of both the ACA and the TCJA, 
the majority party that had passed the legislation lost control of the House in 
the election that followed the passage of the legislation.287 Even if the majority 
party maintains its majority, changed dynamics within that party may prevent 
even a reconciliation bill from coming to pass. One obstacle in particular is 
likely to be troublesome: the need to pass a new budget resolution in order to 
kick-off a new round of reconciliation.288 Relatedly, even when the majority 
party maintains its votes for long enough to pass corrective legislation and its 
internal dynamics remain stable, the majority party may worry that offering 
new legislation on the heels of the original legislation may offer the minority 
party an opportunity to make unforeseeable amendments to the new 
legislative vehicle, which may imperil the legislative victory that was just 
won.289 Alternatively, as a political matter, the majority party simply may want 
to move on after legislative passage, even if the cost of doing so is leaving 
 
 286. Of course, the change would eliminate the ability of the minority party to extract high 
concessions in exchange for agreeing to fixes. However, which way this cuts is not clear, as, in the 
abstract, each party could one day imagine being in the position of the minority party.  
 287. Election 2010: House Map, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2010/ 
results/house.html [https://perma.cc/958Z-9HTQ]; U.S. House Election Results 2018, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 15, 2019, 2:08 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/elections/ 
results-house-elections.html [https://perma.cc/ZL8Z-YYF3]. 
 288. See, e.g., MEGAN S. LYNCH & JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44058,  
THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS: STAGES OF CONSIDERATION 2 (2017), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44058.pdf [https://perma.cc/65KR-4WET] (explaining steps 
in process); David Reich & Richard Kogan, Introduction to Budget “Reconciliation,” CTR. ON BUDGET 
& POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/introduction-to-budget-
reconciliation [https://perma.cc/53C8-DP6W] (last updated Nov. 9, 2016) (explaining that the 
Senate can only consider one reconciliation bill a year with respect to each of the three basic 
reconciliation subjects (spending, revenues, and debt limit), unless Congress passes a new budget 
resolution); Yin, supra note 65, at 219 (pointing to difficulty in passing a budget as a potential 
limiting factor on use of reconciliation).  
 289. Oei & Osofsky, supra note 26, at 1322–23 (citing concerns of Congress members that 
technical corrections legislation would get hijacked to serve other purposes). 
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mistakes in place. Finally, to the extent the baseline is changed to allow fixing 
mistakes to be scored as affecting revenue, making the changes may be 
revenue-reducing in certain circumstances. It may be politically difficult for 
Congress to pass legislation that reduces revenue on the heels of the recently 
enacted, major legislation.290   
All of these potential political obstacles to fixing mistakes, even with the 
new suggested baseline, are real. As a result, changing the baseline for fixing 
mistakes through reconciliation will not result in Congress fixing all mistakes. 
But, changing the baseline should still substantially increase Congress’ ability 
to fix mistakes. The change will thus respond more sensibly to the mistakes 
that are not only inevitable in any legislative process, but also are more likely 
to occur given the nature of today’s legislative process.  
One final objection to this suggested change to reconciliation practices 
is that it is not ambitious enough. It would only enable legislation that was 
passed through reconciliation to get fixed in reconciliation. And this is true, 
as far as it goes. But, as illustrated by recent legislative history, reconciliation 
is important.291 Congress has been using reconciliation in more and more 
expansive ways, leading the most recent two administrations to pass signature 
legislative achievements at least partially through reconciliation.292 In other 
words, even if this suggested change to reconciliation would not solve every 
problem with the legislative process, it could be a consequential change. 
Moreover, when legislation is not passed through reconciliation in the first 
instance, it is not nearly as problematic to fix. When legislation is passed 
through ordinary procedures, the Congress that passed it presumably had the 
higher vote count required to do so, meaning the Congress that passed it 
should have an easier time getting the votes to make fixes through ordinary 
procedures. Changes to reconciliation therefore may not only be 
consequential, but also may appropriately target the conditions that serve as 
a crux of the problem.  
Rather than making changes to reconciliation, an alternative change 
would be to create a separate procedure whereby a majority vote could pass 
technical corrections, with technical corrections defined as any changes that 
do not have a revenue effect, using the original legislation as a baseline. Other 
limitations might help narrow the definition of technical corrections, for 
 
 290. Cf. Letter from Businesses, supra note 82 (trying to sell Congress on passing a qualified 
improvement property fix by explaining that there would be no revenue cost, since the desired 
fix was scored in the original legislation). The reconciliation legislation must follow the 
reconciliation instructions, in terms of whether the legislation will increase or decrease revenue 
and what limitations apply to any such increases or decreases. See 2 U.S.C. § 641(c)(1)(A)–(B) 
(2012). However, only the legislation, as a whole, needs to increase or decrease revenue in 
accordance with reconciliation instructions. This leaves the possibility that a particular fix could 
decrease revenue even if the reconciliation instructions required an increase. See LYNCH & 
SATURNO, supra note 288, at 3.  
 291. See supra text accompanying notes 66–68. 
 292. See supra text accompanying notes 66–68.  
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instance by cordoning it to technical mistakes identified within a specified 
period of time. However, in many ways, this is already supposed to be the 
practice. For instance, in the tax context, JCT already routinely identifies 
technical corrections after legislative passage.293  
Congress used to routinely pass such technical corrections,294 but the 
dynamics endemic to today’s legislative dysfunction stymie routine passage of 
such corrections. Given today’s hyper-partisanship and general legislative 
dysfunction, Congress members now worry that other members will use 
technical corrections bills as a way to sneak in nontechnical changes to the 
prior legislation.295 This level of concern about passing technical corrections 
makes it unlikely that Congress will more formally lower the vote count for 
this somewhat vaguely specified category. Relatedly, many new pieces of 
legislation may not have a revenue effect relative to prior legislation, simply 
because they do not affect revenue at all. Thus, allowing any changes that do 
“not affect revenue” relative to prior legislation to be passed by majority vote 
would essentially kill the supermajority requirement in the Senate, an 
outcome that could have widespread, destabilizing effects. In contrast, 
changing the baseline for reconciliation preserves the existing limitations (as 
manipulable as those limitations might be) on reconciliation, but makes them 
better suited to address legislative drafting mistakes. The reconciliation 
proposal thus serves as the most plausible, though surely not a comprehensive 
or foolproof, way to improve Congress’ ability to fix its own mistakes. 
2. Changes to Agency Practice 
Finally, agency legislative fixes inevitably will continue to some extent, 
notwithstanding changes made to the legislative process. Agencies could try 
to make these fixes more transparent and systematic. This Article has revealed 
that, in assessing whether to issue legislative fixes, agencies use criteria for 
which there is no clear legal authority—such as whether the agency has heard 
from the “four horsemen” that a fix should be made.296 If agencies believe 
certain criteria should control decisions about making agency legislative fixes, 
they could make such criteria transparent and systematize decisions to ensure 
they comport with such criteria. Indeed, agencies could even do so through a 
notice-and-comment period, in order to garner the benefits of public input 
and legitimacy that accompany such procedures.297 Even short of notice and 
 
 293. Gerson, supra note 81, at 931.  
 294. Bernstein, supra note 84 (describing technical corrections as previously a “routine” part 
of the process).  
 295. See, e.g., Oei & Osofsky, supra note 26, at 1322–23 (citing this concern); Stamper, supra 
note 81, at 716 (citing concern of Senate Finance Committee Chair Chuck Grassley that technical 
corrections can become a “magnet for every change that people want to make in the tax code”). 
 296. See supra Section III.C.3.  
 297. See supra text accompanying notes 249–50.  
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comment, agencies can do more to publicize and justify the agency legislative 
fixes they make. 
The intuition here is that transparent and internally-binding agency 
guidelines can recreate some of the rule-of-law values that are lost when 
agencies act in ways that either appear to contravene, or are not otherwise 
controlled by, governing law. At first blush, agencies overriding statutory 
dictates through informal guidance, such as FAQs on a website, appears to be 
completely inconsistent with rule-of-law values. However, as scholars have 
increasingly identified in other contexts, agencies often have to make 
decisions that either appear inconsistent with, or at least are outside of, 
governing law.298 When agencies publicize these decisions in ways that bind 
agency officials, they may actually increase legitimacy by promoting values 
such as notice, fairness, and justification that are central to rule of law.299 
Moreover, by making the criteria for agency legislative fixes public, 
agencies can invite accountability into a process that is otherwise shrouded 
from it. Agency officials are not elected and do not have to answer directly at 
the ballot box for their administration of the law. This makes agencies’ power 
to subvert Congress particularly dangerous. However, agencies can reduce 
this danger by making public the policies used to assess whether to fix a 
legislative drafting mistake, such as considering Congress member’s own 
efforts to fix the drafting mistakes. Doing so allows accountable elected 
officials, as well as the public, to weigh in on and ultimately shape the criteria 
for decisions.300  
Making such policies public also puts members of the public on more 
equal footing. For instance, well-connected parties would be aware of 
Treasury’s practice of issuing legislative fixes when Treasury has heard from 
the four horsemen. Such parties could then direct efforts toward the four 
horsemen, to get them to pressure Treasury to make an agency legislative fix. 
 
 298. Freeman & Spence, supra note 25, at 17–62 (examining how agencies have to address 
outdated statutes in the face of congressional inaction); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion 
and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 676 (2014) (“Given the breadth of modern statutory 
prohibitions and the limitations on available resources for enforcement, federal officials must 
necessarily leave many statutory violations unpunished.”).  
 299. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 
125 YALE L.J. 104, 174–207 (2015) (praising the Obama administration’s institutionalization of 
immigration enforcement discretion on rule of law and other grounds); Metzger, supra note 247, 
at 1928–29 (addressing President Obama’s nonenforcement policies); Gillian E. Metzger & 
Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239, 1258 (2017) (identifying 
“authorization, notice, justification, coherence, and procedural fairness” as rule-of-law values 
promoted by internal administrative measures (footnote omitted)); Osofsky, supra note 127, at 
87–112 (examining the impact of categorical nonenforcement on agency legitimacy). 
 300. Beermann, supra note 123, at 122–30 (exploring Congress’ involvement in the 
administration of the law); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2380 
(2001) (setting forth a model of presidential control of agencies); Glen Staszewski, Political 
Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 861–66 (2012) 
(arguing that there are limits on political control and exploring a deliberative approach). 
A4_OSOFSKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/2020  8:41 AM 
2020] AGENCY LEGISLATIVE FIXES 2165 
If agency policies about legislative fixes are not publicized, less well-connected 
parties would be systematically disadvantaged. While power and privilege of 
course affect legislative and regulatory outcomes and cannot be neutralized 
entirely,301 agencies publicizing their criteria for fixes nonetheless would at 
least increase the potential for less well-connected parties to make efficacious 
appeals for fixes.  
Relatedly, pre-committing to policies that dictate when to create agency 
legislative fixes may help ameliorate agency legislative fixes’ negative 
tendency to systematically advantage regulated parties in informal guidance. 
For instance, indicating that agency legislative fixes should be provided when 
certain criteria are met may embolden agencies to offer fixes even when they 
may be challenged by regulated parties. Even if an agency’s fixes are 
challenged and ultimately struck down, the agency’s willingness to take action 
may better encourage Congress to make a needed fix.302  
However, while more transparency and systematic decisionmaking 
around agency legislative fixes may be an improvement in some respects, 
there would be some accompanying problems with this approach. The first is 
whether agencies would adopt it. Part of the reason agencies are using formats 
like FAQs (without any accompanying explanation) is to deal with the matter 
expeditiously without attracting too much public scrutiny.303 The notion that 
agencies may voluntarily draw significantly more attention to guidance that 
seems to directly conflict with the statute may seem somewhat fanciful. It is 
possible that central executive policy, such as mandates handed down from 
OIRA to be more forthcoming about agency legislative fixes, might be used 
to force agencies’ hands and yield more transparency.304 But, if this outcome 
is achieved, there would be yet another cost. More transparent and 
systematized agency legislative fixes, perhaps happening under OIRA’s 
auspices, would also seem to formalize what at least some would think was an 
affront to Congress’ constitutional power, and even do so by involving higher 
levels of the executive branch.  
This leads to one final, potential change. Aware of its likelihood of 
making legislative drafting mistakes, Congress could explicitly delegate to 
agencies the authority to fix such mistakes.305 This approach could, in  
 
 301. See, e.g., John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 
591, 609–11 (2005) (exploring what money can and cannot buy in the political process).  
 302. Cf. Melnick, supra note 45, at 784 (discussing executive action as a prod to get Congress 
to act).  
 303. Cf. Lawrence Zelenak, The Uses and Abuses of Simplexity, 66 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2011, 
2020–22 (2017) (describing how the IRS dealt with a legislative drafting mistake by issuing what 
it believed to be the correct law in a nonprecedential publication, so as to get the correct result 
without having to make the statement in a more formal source of law).  
 304. Cf., e.g., Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432 
–40 (Jan. 25, 2007) (developing policies and procedures for use of significant guidance by agencies).  
 305. This is akin, in some ways, to statutes that explicitly provide agencies the authority to 
forbear applying certain statutory provisions. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 127, at 851–52 
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theory, help embolden agencies to issue legislative fixes through notice-and-
comment regulations, potentially even when they disadvantage parties with 
standing to sue. This outcome would help ameliorate some of the problematic 
impacts of agency legislative fixes on agency guidance practices. Congress’ 
explicit delegation to agencies to fix mistakes arguably may help legitimate 
agencies’ fixes and ease encroachments on legislative supremacy. 
Some may argue that this approach would be preferable only in the most 
formal sense. Such a delegation would beg the question of what constitutes a 
legislative drafting mistake. Congress’ inherent inability to provide any ex ante 
guidance about what agencies should fix would arguably recreate all the same 
problems that already exist with agency legislative fixes. And it may even do 
so in a way that would raise new constitutional infirmities, such as the problem 
of excessive delegation.306 Moreover, precisely because it is hard to say what 
the limits of such a delegation would be, it is unclear whether Congress, 
fearful of its hard-won legislation being undone, would actually ever explicitly 
delegate power to agencies to fix legislative drafting mistakes.  
But the possibility of such delegations could be better than nothing. 
Congress could tailor such delegations in ways that might make them useful 
and more likely to be used by Congress. For instance, rather than just broadly 
delegating a legislative fix power to agencies in all circumstances, Congress 
could do so only when legislative passage is particularly harried and mistakes 
therefore seem particularly likely. Congress could enhance its control by 
creating timeframes for mistake correction and using other creative 
innovations to enhance its own power over and participation in the process. 
Internal executive review (and potentially even judicial review) may benefit 
from having some standards against which to evaluate an agency’s claim that 
it is fixing a mistake. Agencies may be able to point to an explicit 
congressional statement that it was worried about making a mistake in certain 
circumstances, thus enabling agencies to root fixes in legislative authority.  
Even if Congress tailors the fix-it delegation to certain situations, there 
would be accompanying problems. For instance, explicit delegations to fix 
mistakes in certain instances may have the undesirable effect of creating an 
unintended inference against a mistake in situations in which Congress does 
not so delegate. And when Congress does delegate this power, it may 
irresponsibly seem to give Congress license to draft poorly. Fundamentally, 
this proposal’s outside-the-box contemplation of the relationship between 
Congress and agencies fits uncomfortably with formal views of separation of 
powers. But understanding the current state of agency legislative fixes 
 
(contemplating a broad legislative grant to narrow the application of certain provisions when 
necessary for administrative reasons). See generally David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of 
Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013) (examining the phenomenon); Deacon, supra note 
25 (examining the phenomenon). 
 306. See, e.g., Deacon, supra note 25, at 1560–64 (setting forth potential constitutional 
problems with Congress granting agencies explicit statutory authority to override statutes).  
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suggests that this, and other possibilities discussed above, nonetheless may be 
improvements over the current threats that agency legislative fixes pose to 
legislative supremacy, agency legitimacy, and agency guidance practices.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Evaluating agency legislative fixes and charting a better path forward is 
no easy task. Agency legislative fixes not only play a critical role in the 
legislative process, but are also in tension with fundamental constitutional, 
democratic, and practical values.  
This Article has illustrated how, after Congress passes flawed legislation, 
a dialogue ensues between Congress and agencies that helps motivate 
agencies to fix legislative drafting mistakes. While these fixes conflict with the 
text of the legislation, agencies nonetheless make them through the use of 
informal guidance and other tactics. Agencies do so based in part on a 
shadowy set of criteria, such as the assent of the “four horsemen,” which sit 
outside of the legal framework and have escaped attention of existing 
scholarship.  
The most promising path forward is to reorient the baseline for 
determining eligibility for reconciliation when legislative drafting mistakes 
have been made. This may put Congress’ ability to correct its mistakes on 
more equal footing with Congress’ ability to make them. Other changes are 
possible, each of which offers tradeoffs between different, conflicting values. 
In an ideal world, Congress would not make mistakes in passing 
legislation and, when Congress did make such mistakes, it would fix them. 
The realities of the legislative process are far from this ideal. We need to 
recognize, evaluate, and seek to reform the role agency legislative fixes are 
playing in light of the real-world constraints today’s legislative process 
presents. 
  
 
 
